2025_1_Sostaric_Baljkas

Emotional Responses to the Beginning and End of the Rulepdf of Louis I
in Dalmatia

Valentina Šoštarić and Krešimir Baljkas

University of Zadar

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Hungarian Historical Review Volume 14 Issue 1 (2025): 3-29 DOI 10.38145/2025.1.3 

This paper presents a brief historical background of the rule of Louis I of Hungary in Dalmatia, followed by an analysis of the emotional reactions of the ruling circles in Zadar, Split, and Dubrovnik to two crucial events in 1358 and 1382, which marked the establishment and subsequent weakening of Angevin rule. Although the sociopolitical context of Louis’ rule is well established, the role of emotions during these critical moments has not received sufficient scholarly attention. This innovative problem-centered approach requires methodological clarification of the applications of the concept of emotions in historiography, as well as the possibilities and limitations arising from the nature of archival sources. The emotions expressed in these sources will be considered as a powerful tool with which to provoke tangible changes in the real world, specifically to motivate historical actors to take concrete actions. These rhetorical devices and narrative structures, understood here as expressions of emotion, will be scrutinized within the wider framework of sociopolitical, cultural, and religious interconnections. Through an analysis of primary sources, this study aims to offer insights concerning a possible range of emotions experienced by historical actors during the tumultuous political events surrounding the establishment of Angevin rule and the dissolution of the same after Louis’ death. Specifically, the paper interprets elements of the texts as expressions of emotions such as fear, insecurity, anxiety, envy, disappointment, dissatisfaction, happiness, love, and hatred in order to provide a deeper understanding of how these decisive moments were understood and presented by the authors at the time. This study aims to enrich our current understanding by emphasizing the significance of appeals to and expressions of emotional responses as a lens through which to examine political and social change.

Keywords: Dalmatia, Croatian history, Angevin dynasty, King Louis I, history of emotions

Research Topic: Issues and Possibilities

The establishment of Angevin rule in Dalmatian cities marked a significant turning point in the course of historical events along the eastern Adriatic coast. Having successfully concluded the conflict with Venice and adeptly pacified the influential nobility in the immediate hinterland, Louis the Great paved the way for the reintegration of coastal communities with their natural hinterlands. This harmonization unfolded within the new, strengthened political framework of the Hungarian and Croatian Kingdom. The triumphant culmination of decades-­long efforts by the new dynasty, formally crowned with the signing of the Zadar Peace Treaty in 1358, created the conditions for the social and economic development of the eastern Adriatic coastal region.1 Furthermore, the reaffirmation of royal authority in the immediate hinterland established the patterns of the structures upon which the social and political life of the Croatian nobility would now rest, and which would last until finally disintegrating under the Ottoman conquests.2 While extensive scholarly attention has been devoted to almost every facet of Louis’s ascension to power, including its repercussions for preexisting sociopolitical3 and economic dynamics,4 artistic evolution,5 and legal codification,6 scant scholarly interest has been given to the emotional responses of the ruling circles of Dalmatian cities, as expressed in the textual sources, following Louis’ triumph over the Venetians and during the years characterized by uncertainty in the aftermath of his demise.

Historians have typically confined the study of emotions to the field of psychology, and in the contemporary scholarship, neuroscience has come to the forefront.7 Emotions, long overlooked in historiography, started to gain attention in the mid-twentieth century8 and were made a central research topic within the social sciences and humanities by the end of the century.9 Within historiographical research, the “field of emotions”10 is frequently marked by conflicting theories, methodologies, and diverse perspectives on complex issues, and this has fostered its rapid development as a subject of study.11 The diversity of concepts, methodological approaches, and research questions posed has led to such an abundance of studies that contemporary researchers now refer to as a paradigm shift, often termed the “emotional/affective turn.”12

Considering the multitude of potential definitions of the term “emotions,”13 it is important to emphasize that, in this paper, they will be approached as sociocultural, situational, and relational constructs.14 Emotions play a significant role in shaping social interactions15 and decision-making processes, particularly within the sphere of high politics.16 Against this backdrop, this article aims to discern textual expressions of emotions in relation to the medieval system of dependency and power relations, the prevailing culture, and the influence of specific emotional responses on the course of historical events.

In part as an attempt to address the existing lacuna in the secondary literature, the interpretation focuses on the expression of specific emotions in the narrative and administrative records of the councils of Zadar, Split, and Dubrovnik in the context of the two aforementioned historical changes. This will be attempted primarily by referring to elements in the surviving sources on the basis of which hypotheses can be ventured concerning the collective emotions of the ruling elite of the eastern Adriatic urban centers. Since the councilors were not a homogeneous “emotional community”17 and they did not share the same political worldviews during the transitional moments analyzed in this paper, it is important to consider which individuals within these communities might have experienced certain emotions, and whether these emotions were genuinely felt or were they a part of a specific manipulative rhetorical strategy. While administrative sources are the product of meticulous consideration and extensive discussions, the complete suppression of any expression of emotions within these text seems to have been challenging. The places where these expressions of emotion appear are symptomatic and warrant scientific attention and interpretation. Some of these expressions of emotion can be recognized as recurring themes, while others seem to have been the result of sudden changes in the realm of high politics. On the other hand, chronicles were used to a lesser extent, and when evaluating them, it is important to consider authorship and the historical-temporal context of their creation.

To a certain extent, these examples reveal the existence of stereotypical emotions. There are several different models that explain how emotions arise and the possibilities for their use. For the purposes of the inquiry here, the most applicable model is a combination of cognitive and social constructivism. While the first theoretical approach argues that the choice of which emotions to express depends on whether these emotions would be perceived as useful or harmful,18 the second approach holds that expressions of emotions depend on language, expectations, values, cultural practices, moral beliefs, and rules according to which these expressions of emotion can be correctly decoded.19 In this sense, expressions of emotion can be consciously employed and manipulated in a specific context to provoke a desired effect.20 Although it is impossible for us today to answer the question of whether a specific emotional expression was truly felt or was simply a matter of textual, rhetorical performance and strategy, this is ultimately not important. What matters is that a given expression of emotion would have been recognized and accurately interpreted (interpreted as the author presumably wanted it to be) by its intended readership. Finally, it is crucial to detect how expressions of emotions are managed, considering the personal power and reputation of individuals or groups, as well as their status, origins, and the relationships among the interlocutors. In other words, it is of paramount interest to observe who gives expression to particular emotions, when and where they do so, and who they are addressing, much as it is also of interest to consider their possible reasons for giving expression to these emotions and how these emotions may have influenced the relationships among political actors and shaped their specific actions.

Establishment of Angevin Rule

The authorities in Dubrovnik21 were well aware of the establishment of Louis’ rule in Dalmatian cities. While some councilors expressed enthusiasm and excitement about Louis’ successes and the prospect of rejecting Venetian rule, others viewed these changes with concern and expressed fear and anxiety.22 The division within the ruling elite concerning loyalty to Venetian rule or the integration of their homeland into the community of the lands annexed to the Crown of St. Stephen led to the formation of two factions, one pro-Venice and the other pro-Hungarian.23 Even among the noblemen who favored claiming Louis as their new sovereign there was no consensus regarding the position of Dubrovnik in the new community. Nenad Vekarić, in his research, has demonstrated that in 1358 the Gundulić clan was dominant, with its two factions, the Gundulić faction and the Gučetić faction.24 Both factions were characterized by a pro-Hungarian orientation, but the Gundulić clan sought greater Ragusan autonomy, while the Gučetić faction supported less autonomy for the small maritime republic. A conflict arose between Marin Klementov de Gozze, the king’s confidant and a supporter of the Gučetić clan, and Marin Lukarov de Bona and Marin Junijev de Mençe, members of the Gundulić clan. This conflict led to Marin filing charges against the two aforementioned noblemen before the court of the Ban of Dalmatia and Croatia in 1361. Marin’s actions were prompted by previous accusations made by his opponents, who had cast doubt on Marin’s loyal service to the city in front of the Ragusan government.25

Nevertheless, the councilors promptly prevented the factional split of the nobility, as well as uprisings by the commoners, which were common in other Dalmatian cities during these turbulent years.26 The rigidity of the Ragusan ruling structures aimed at preserving, even nominally, internal harmony and consistency in foreign affairs. This is particularly evident if one compares the same mechanisms of internal control with other Dalmatian cities where they failed. Split, Trogir, and Šibenik were, one after another, shaken by the escalation of factional struggles among the city nobility at the time and immediately after the significant political changes. In contrast with Ragusa, in these cities, the final resolution of the internal divisions had to come “from outside,” or in other words, it had to be imposed by the intervention of royal representatives.27

The Ragusan councilors ultimately agreed to send their representatives promptly to Louis I in Visegrád to negotiate the most favorable terms for the city’s integration into the Archiregnum Hungaricum. Emotions tied to the aura surrounding the ambassadors sent to Hungary awoke suspicions among the authorities and prompted them to show caution, as they feared potential betrayal.28 These ambassadors, as privileged individuals enjoyed significant personal power, and some of them possessed inherited emotional capital from previous encounters with the king.29 In this context, it is noteworthy to mention the case of the king’s close confidant, Marin Klementov de Gozze, who faced an investigation in his hometown for surpassing entrusted authority and having made arbitrary decisions. Marin was ultimately released due to the king’s direct intervention in his favor.30 However, the authorities in Dubrovnik did not hesitate to protest, and they beseeched Louis to refrain from intervening in such a manner on Marin’s behalf or on the behalf of any other Ragusan noblemen.31 Dubrovnik was in something of a unique position after having become part of the Crown of St. Stephen. Apart from Zadar, it was the only city in Dalmatia with a notable number of noblemen among its denizens who had successfully established individual relationships with the ruler. Still, predominant position in the new regime belonged to the members of the Zadar’s nobility. Royal knights from the ranks of Zadar’s nobility, thanks to this accumulated symbolic and direct political capital, played a significant role in the political and social infrastructure of Angevin rule in Dalmatia, holding important positions in other Dalmatian cities.32

The Ragusans used sophisticated emotional strategies concerning the establishment of Louis’ rule in Dalmatia. Chronicler Junije Resti cautioned the Ragusan councilors to be wise in navigating between two equally dangerous forces. He warned them not to arouse Venetian jealousy toward Louis due to the loss of Dalmatia. Resti concluded his reflections by praising the emotional intelligence of the city’s authorities, contrasting it with the ruling elites of Zadar, who, lacking it, continually faced the consequences of Venetian military interventions.33

During the years it spent under the protection of a powerful yet distant sovereign, Dubrovnik enjoyed a security that allowed it to develop autonomously, ushering in its golden era.34 In the period following the recognition of Angevin rule, many Dalmatian cities expressed great disappointment with the royal house and its blatant violations of agreements it had reached with them. These frustrations led to conspiracies and rebellions. Dubrovnik, in contrast, was satisfied, in general, with the conditions according to which it had recognized Louis as its sovereign. It is thus not surprising that the authorities frequently emphasized their loyalty to the crown and king, often motivated by the privileges and various benefits he had granted them, such as the right freely to elect the city rector35 and also trade privileges with Serbia and Venice, even in the case of war between the Croatian-Hungarian king and one of these countries.36 Hence, it is unsurprising that the Ragusan authorities often expressed their love” and affection” for the crown and king.

While discussions among the Ragusan elite were primarily concentrated on the rights and obligations arising from having become part of the Angevin Archiregnum, events and circumstances in other Dalmatian communities were characterized by various expressions of a much greater range of emotions due to the distinctive political and geographical backdrops in each of these communities.37 With the systematic suppression of all forms of local autonomy by Venice and the introduction of a new administrative structure that excluded the local nobility, the perspectives and emotions of the Zadar elite became more challenging to discern.38 In other words, following the Venetian suppression of the rebellion in 1346, many members of the Zadar elite were physically removed from the city through forced internment in Venice, and many of them then escaped and fled to areas beyond the reach of the Venetian authorities. Nevertheless, despite the removal and the flight of the most prominent members of the Zadar elite, Venice, by all indications, was unable to pacify the rebellious city completely. During the war, specifically in 1357, lingering dissatisfaction with Venetian rule persisted. A conspiracy was hatched in the city, but it was discovered and thwarted.39 The continued presence of dissidents and “internal enemies” in Zadar, at least from the perspective of Venice, was confirmed by the turmoil, namely the looting and destruction of property, at the moment of the entry of the royal army.40

The political arena of the city of Split during the turbulent period of the establishment of Angevin rule and the immediate aftermath provides a dynamic and significantly more fruitful field for the study of the emotional states of factions within the city elite. After the upheaval had ended,41 the rebellion against Venetian rule had emerged triumphant, and the Angevin banner had been raised over the city.42 Nonetheless, the continued war and the advance of royal forces in Dalmatia were closely monitored by the leading circles of the Split commune. The news of the entry of the royal army into Zadar, announced to the Split Grand Council by the ambassador from Šibenik, was met with joy by the city nobility. Prompted by this news and “as a sign of joy and in honor of the royal highness and the commune of Split,” the Grand Council decided to present the envoy with new clothes.43 The broader context suggests that this act was not merely a matter of a pro forma gift but was in fact a sincere expression of the emotional state of the decision-making members of the Grand Council. Apart from the continuously empty city treasury,44 the Šibenik commune had, in the immediate aftermath of the upheaval in Split, participated in the Venetian punitive expedition against the Split held island of Šolta.45 The messenger from Šibenik was now, just a few short months later, generously rewarded at the municipal expense by the decree of the Split Grand Council. The generosity towards former enemies, especially emphasized by the unfavorable financial circumstances of the Split commune, can further be interpreted through those emotional states whose existence we can only glimpse indirectly. Besides, almost certainly, giving impetus to thoughts of the imminent end of the war,46 the news of the entry of royal forces into Zadar likely instilled a sense of relief among the members of the Split elite. Their choice during the recent coup, siding with the Angevin sovereign, had seemingly been vindicated.47 However, when shortly afterward the official news about the success of the royal arms at Zadar arrived in Split, this time conveyed by the envoy of the Ban John Csúz, knight Kónya, it is hard to escape the impression that the initial euphoria within the ranks of the Split elite has somewhat dampened. The invitation of the city podestà Gentilis for the Great Council of Split to act in accordance with the ban’s wishes and to appropriately reward his messenger is met with nominal approval, but this time without the overt expressions of joy. Furthermore, the decision was accompanied with a somewhat measured clause stating that the final value of the gift should not exceed, still not insignificant, sum of 40 ducats.48

A less easily traceable but undoubtedly more significant case of the cor­relation between the emotions and the concrete steps taken by political actors occurred in the middle of 1359. At the session of the Grand Council in July of that year, the main point of discussion was the question of how to proceed with the unnamed conspirators against the honor of “our lord the King.”49 While neither the names nor the social statuses of the conspirators (not to mention the ultimate goal of the conspiracy) are clear to us today, we can say much more about the disagreements and tensions between the Split commune and the royal authorities that preceded the conspiracy and therefore probably had a significant impact on its formation.

The period following the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Zadar bore witness to the rapid shaping of a new administrative infrastructure through which the Angevin king intended to rule.50 While the position of Zadar was seemingly vindicated,51 it became increasingly apparent that the new power configuration was diametrically opposed to the desired, idealized vision of the postwar order inherited by the leading strata of the Split elite. Angevin control over the leading administrative functions in the city, demonstrated by the abolition of the position of the city podestà and the reaffirmation of the role of the city count,52 along with interference in the judicial autonomy of the com­mune,53 likely resulted in a growing sense of dissatisfaction among some of the city nobility.54 The existence of a certain level of dissatisfaction in the new periphery was apparently acknowledged even in the center of the kingdom. The charter granted by the royal commission to the neighboring city of Trogir in August 1359 explicitly states that economic benefits were provided with the aim of resolving issues or complaints.55 Taking into account the aforementioned actions of the political center, as illustrated by the example of Split, it is not unreasonable to assume that the charter issued by the royal commission was intended to achieve several different goals. Apart from alleviating the economic difficulties peculiar to Trogir,56 the charter likely represented a step towards mitigating the (presumably significantly broader) wave of complaints. Said complaints, which were apparently also being made in other Dalmatian cities, were evidently caused by both the administrative and the new economic policies implemented by the Angevin dynasty in Dalmatia.57

Did the dissidents in the region, who we can presume were there and were active on the basis of the Trogir charter, hide the unnamed participants in the failed conspiracy that was discussed in the Split Great Council in July 1359? Unfortunately, we cannot give a reliable answer to this question.58 Similarly unclear is whether, due to royal pressure on municipal autonomy, there had been a resurgence of the pro-Venice party.59 Alternatively, was the failed conspiracy an internally generated attempt to revise the existing political stratification of the Split commune at the moment of or, more precisely, immediately after a radical political change, similar to earlier examples in Trogir and Šibenik?60 Could we identify, as a factor in the final galvanization of accumulated dissatisfaction, the growing apprehension of the urban elite concerning its gradual loss of control over the local levers of power? Apprehension that was seemingly made manifest in the royal imposition of the Ban of Dalmatia and Croatia on the office of the city count? The sources do not permit us to offer clear answers to these questions.61 We can reasonably assume, however, that during the period that began with the establishment of royal authority over Split through the years following the end of the war, members of Split’s political and social elite gave expression to a relatively wide range of emotions. The victories of the royal forces in Dalmatia may very well have been met with shows of joy, enthusiasm, and relief. The consolidation of Angevin authority and especially the implementation of a new political and social order in the province, however, have led to a radical shift in the emotional state of the urban nobility. In stark contrast to the initial positive emotional responses to the establishment of Angevin rule, the consolidation of Louis’ reign nurtured feelings of dissatisfaction and disappointment among the Split nobility with the actions of the new ruler. These accumulated resentments would eventually find form in the ultimate sin on the medieval political stage: a conspiracy against the sovereign in July 1359.

Turmoil after Louis’ Death

The death of Louis in the autumn of 1382 in Nagyszombat (today Trnava, Slovakia) marked the end of an era.62 At that moment, love for the king was confirmed through the expression of posthumous honors and the organization of a memorial service. However, in Dubrovnik and, indeed, in the whole of Dalmatia unrest and uncertainty had taken hold. The first measure was to organize defense under these extraordinary circumstances.63 This was confirmed by the decision, voted on by Dubrovnik’s Great Council on September 25, 1382, pro dando salvamentum nobis et nostre civitati et rebus nostris occasione obitus domini nostri naturalis domini regis Ungarie.64 The commune of Dubrovnik was particularly afraid of the Bosnian ban Tvrtko, who planned to establish a competing salt market in Novi.65 The prevailing uncertainty in years that followed Loius’ death nurtured fears among the people of Dubrovnik, who sought to mitigate the turmoil caused by dynastic conflicts by forming an alliance with the people of Zadar against Venice. It is interesting to point out that the people of Zadar took the initiative to establish communication and cooperation among the Dalmatian cities against the expansionist ambitions of the Serenissima.66 On numerous occasions during that period, initiatives for the creation of an alliance of Dalmatian cities were put forward.67 Thus, fear seems to have functioned as a driving emotion in those uncertain times and resulted in collaboration and joint action among the Dalmatian cities.

Although the carefully maintained Angevin infrastructure on the periphery of the kingdom did not begin immediately begin to splinter after Louis’ death, it was not long before the first cracks started to appear in the rest of Dalmatia as well. Concern about the uncertain future on the threshold of a new era can be indirectly discerned from the previously mentioned hectic diplomatic activity of the commune of Zadar. One month after Louis’ death, in October 1382, the people of Zadar established “a bond of unity, brotherhood, and eternal friendship” with Count Butko Kurjaković, all the while pledging their “loyalty to our queens and to the Holy Crown of Hungary.”68 Although at first glance this information may seem insubstantial, the diplomatic move by the Zadar commune suggests a prevailing sense of insecurity that took hold in the immediate aftermath of the king’s death. This line of reasoning, or more precisely, the interpretation according to which one can see, in this diplomatic act, Zadar’s desire to acquire at least some semblance of security, even if it be only in the immediate hinterland, can be further underlined by the fact that previous attempts to connect political factors inside the territory of Angevin Dalmatia during Louis’ lifetime were stopped by the royal authorities.69 Judging by this diplomatic activity and from the presumed perspective of the city’s nobility, the task of preserving the city’s security, which before had been firmly placed in the hands of the Angevin ruler for a period of decades, had once again become the duty of the local elite. This would suggest that the recent developments had given rise to a sense of unease. The nobility of Zadar, previously firmly integrated into the Angevin administrative structure, felt the need to act independently under these new circumstances and to take care of the city’s security with their own resources.

Uncertainty about the development of events in Dalmatia and possibly also a certain degree of mistrust in the loyalty of the local political factors likely existed in the center of the kingdom as well. Queen Elizabeth therefore attempted to strengthen the loyalty of the urban centers on the east Adriatic coast, first indirectly by means of letters and envoys and then through a personal visit.70 The course of events that took place in Zadar provides us with a revealing, albeit borderline, indicator of broader sentiment in Dalmatia.71 Namely, the previously mentioned mistrust of the royal government with regards to the local authorities seemed to prove justified. In the middle of 1384, the city authorities in Zadar were forced to deal brutally with several conspirators against Angevin rule. In the immediate aftermath of the executions, local authorities were compelled to carry out once again the social ritual of swearing fealty in front of representatives of the crown.

Although the scant number of conspirators who were executed does not suggest that the plot had broader backing within the ranks of the city elite, the number of councilors listed at the ceremony in 1384 is revealing. The fact that only 23 councilors took the new oath of fealty, in contrast with the 75 councilors who had been present for the same ceremony in 1383, indirectly leads to the conclusion that there had been a discernible and clearly notable stratification among the ranks of the city nobility in terms of loyalty to the crown.72 In contrast to previous and somewhat united efforts to resist Venetian rule, the noble class of Zadar was by then presumably fractured with significantly more pronounced divisions than had been the case in previous times. Although we can determine neither the causes of the dissatisfaction that prompted the aforementioned conspiracy nor the actions that immediately preceded its open culmination, it is particularly significant to note that the betrayal occured in Zadar, a city that represented a stronghold of Angevin authority in Dalmatia.73 Given the particularities of the city and its elite within the Angevin administration, the events in Zadar still offer a valuable indicator of the possible sentiment present in other Dalmatian communes. In any case, the events in Zadar gradually began to match the pace of the unrest in the broader Croatian territory, thus offering an ominous prelude to future events.

Conclusion

A comparison of emotional reactions regarding the establishment of Louis’ rule in Dalmatia reveals noticeable sentiments of excitement and uncertainty, accompanied by divisions within the noble class. Recognition of Louis as their sovereign allowed the people of Dubrovnik to experience autonomous development under his protection. Provided with security and prosperity, Dubrovnik expressed a strong sense of loyalty towards the Crown. With the notable exception of Zadar, which would now come to enjoy a privileged position, with its nobility playing a significant role in the new regime, other cities in Dalmatia were added to the Crown of St. Stephen under less favorable conditions. These conditions were sometimes grossly violated, leading to expressions of dissatisfaction with and bitterness towards the authority of the individuals who worked in the king’s service. During Louis’ rule, the people of Split initially experienced joy and expressed enthusiasm for the new sovereign. However, as time went on, they began to express increasing disappointment and eventually open dissatisfaction, as their expectations regarding the strengthening of municipal self-governance remained unfulfilled. The imposition of a royal confidante who served in the role of the city count was a particularly great blow, as this figure was a foreign magnate who violated the old rights and customs of the city. Dissatisfaction with the actions of the new authorities eventually found expression in the unsuccessful rebellion against royal rule.

After Louis’ death, a sense of fear and uncertainty was felt in all Dalmatian cities, further amplified by Tvrtko’s and Venetian expansionist aspirations. The crisis, uncertainty, and vulnerability, along with the feelings of anxiety, insecurity, and fear that they fueled, could have either strengthened the internal cohesion of the ruling elites or ignited divisions among them. The tumult following Louis’ death caused internal dissension and disagreements among the nobility in Zadar. Meanwhile, the real and perceived threats united the ruling elite of Dubrovnik and made them act in unison. Divisions among the nobility of Zadar regarding the succession and the question of loyalty to the new queens resulted in an attempted rebellion, foretelling the significant turmoil that would affect the city in the coming years.

Another important consequence of the crisis was the creation of an alliance of Dalmatian cities, driven by the people of Zadar, which was a novelty compared to previous periods, when integration and cooperation among the cities on the eastern Adriatic coast were mostly absent. Similar efforts in the past, when attempted under the unifying banner of the royal crown, were halted in their infancy. The fact that then, after almost half a century of Angevin rule, there was a renewed need for and independent initiative aimed at collective protection reflects the atmosphere of uncertainty that prevailed on the kingdom’s periphery following Louis’ death.

Ultimately, it is evident that the various emotions expressed, whether enthusiasm, fear, satisfaction, disappointment, excitement, anxiety, love, or resent­ment, both originated in and actively influenced the relationship that a particular city had with its sovereign and communication between this city and the ruler. Only if we consider these emotions, as well as the causes behind them and the potential outcomes associated with them, from analyzing the significant historical changes which came with the establishment and end of Louis’ rule, are we in a position to provide a more comprehensive understanding and draw more complete conclusions about these, in many respects pivotal, events.

Archival Sources

Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku [State Archive in Dubrovnik] (SAD)

Reformationes, ser. 2, vol. 18.

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  1. 1 Raukar, “Komunalna društva,” 140; Magaš, “Zadarski mir 1358,” 177–78.

  2. 2 According to Antoljak, the Ottoman advance serves as a plausible explanation for the disappearance of the Croatian nobility in the hinterland of Zadar: Antoljak “Izumiranje i nestanak,” 108–9. Differing perspectives on the nobility’s vanishing act, examined through the lens of contemporary social changes, are presented by Majnarić: “Niže i srednje plemstvo,” 341; Majnarić, Plemstvo zadarskog zaleđa, 14–15. Correlations between the Angevin restoration in Croatia and the new patterns of the social and political structures are shown in Majnarić, “Kasnosrednjovjekovna obiteljska struktura”; Majnarić, Plemstvo zadarskog zaleđa, 14, 44–55, 61. On the broader context of the establishment of Angevin rule in the cities of the eastern Adriatic region, see: Gruber, “Borba Ludovika I. s Mlečanima”; Gruber, “Dalmacija za Ludovika I. (1358–1382)”; Klaić and Petricioli, Zadar u srednjem vijeku; Klaić, Povijest Hrvata; Klaić, “Značenje vladavine Anžuvinaca”; Karbić, “Defining the Position of Croatia”; Engel, The Realm of St Stephen; Ančić and Nekić, Zadarski mir.

  3. 3 Ančić and Nekić, Zadarski mir; Halász, “The congregatio generalis banalis”; Karbić, “Defining the position”; Majnarić, “The Title.”

  4. 4 Raukar, “Arpadovići i Anžuvinci,” 231.

  5. 5 Antoljak, “Vladarski dvor (palača) i kraljevske kuće”; Jakšić, “Od hagiografskog obrasca”; Kovačević, “Ophodni križ,” 29–42; Munk, “Kraljica i njezina škrinja.”

  6. 6 See: Gruber, “Vojevanje Ljudevita I. u Dalmaciji.”

  7. 7 Mandressi, “Le temps profound.”

  8. 8 Febvre, “La sensibilité et l’histoire.” This essay has been published in English translation: “Sensibility and History.” For a concise overview of the historical development of emotions, see: Rosenwein, “Problems and Methods.”

  9. 9 For the impact of cultural studies on the natural and social sciences in the study of emotions and how their models, theories, and concepts can be used by historians, see: Ruberg, “Interdisciplinarity and the History of Emotions.”

  10. 10 A new field for studying the history of emotions is marked by the term “emotionology.” See: Stearns and Stearns, “Emotionology.”

  11. 11 Plamper, “The History of the Emotions”; Matt, “Current Emotion Research in History”; Eustace et al., “AHR Conversation”; Matt and Stearns, Doing Emotions History.

  12. 12 Lemmings and Brooks, “The Emotional Turn”; Lebow, “Reason,” 284.

  13. 13 The terminological plurality in the usage of emotions, feelings, and affects is clarified by Smith-Lovin, “The Sociology.” For an exploration of various concepts defining the term “emotions” see: Dixon, “Emotion.” Despite these efforts, consensus remains elusive regarding the triggers of emotions and the distinctions among emotions, feelings, sentiments, and affects, Kleinginna Jr. and Kleinginna, “A Categorized List”; Kagan, What Is Emotion?; Rosenwein, Generations of Feeling, 1–3.

  14. 14 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics.

  15. 15 Harré, The Social Construction. Some researchers believe that emotions arise and are shaped exclusively through human interactions, Burkitt, “Social Relationships.”

  16. 16 Emotions are not only a part of social interaction processes but also play a significant role in the sphere of high politics, Reddy, The Navigation, 124, 128; Reddy, “Against Constructionism,” 335.

  17. 17 Barbara H. Rosenwein defines the term “emotional communities” as “groups in which people respect and act according to the same norms that define the rules for expressing emotions and values, and evaluate or devalue the same or related emotions,” Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, 2.

  18. 18 Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics.”

  19. 19 Bially Mattern, “A practice theory.” For this concept and the accompanying literature, see also: Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions,” 834–37.

  20. 20 Ajzen, “Attitudes”; Gollwitzer, “Implementation intentions.” For contrasting viewpoints, see: Greve, “Traps.”

  21. 21 In this paper, the names Dubrovnik and Ragusa are used in parallel for the city. Alongside the Slavic name Dubrovnik, the city is also referred to in historical sources by the pre-Slavic term R(h)agusa or R(h)agusium/R(h)acusium. Miroslav Kravar proposes the Greek lexeme rhagoûs(s)a as the etymon of the name, a feminine adjective meaning ‘full of cracks, crevices, or karst formations’ (i.e., an island), which aptly corresponds to the coastal configuration of the site in question. For more on this and the course of research on the etymology of the name Ragusa and its variants, see: Kravar, “Oko toponima Ragusa,” 77–87.

  22. 22 Gruber, “Borba Ludovika I. s Mlečanima,” 142–43; Medini, Dubrovnik Gučetića, 19–39; Gelcich, Monumenta Ragusina, vol. II, 155, 168.

  23. 23 Vekarić discerns the disunity within the Ragusan noble class through the division into the Bobaljević, Gučetić, and Gundulić clans. He defines them as groups of mutually favorable families with politically recognizable activities, established and maintained on the principles of strong family tradition. On the clan division in this crucial period, see: Vekarić, Nevidljive pukotine, 35–84, and for the Hungarian supporters: 54–67.

  24. 24 Vekarić, Nevidljive pukotine, 37–38.

  25. 25 Gelcich, Monumenta Ragusina, vol. III, 110, 114, 175; Šoštarić, “Dubrovački poklisari,” 170–71.

  26. 26 Resti, Chronica Ragusina, 136; Gelcich, Monumenta Ragusina, vol. II, 207–8, 210–11, 219, 234, 244; Gruber, “Dalmacija za Ludovika I. (1358–1382),” 171, 180–81; Gruber, “Borba Ludovika I. s Mlečanima,” 84–86.

  27. 27 In addition to the upheaval that brought the city centers of Dalmatia under the rule of the Angevin sovereign, the existence of divisions within the ranks of the city nobility becomes apparent through revolts that ensued during the initial phase of subjugation to royal authority. This occurred in a period characterized by the instability of the new political order, which had not yet stabilized, making it susceptible to further changes. The rebellion in Trogir, though briefly mentioned, serves as a poignant illustration of these internal challenges: Lucii, De regno, 384; Rismondo, A Cutheis tabula, 198–99. On the upheavals in Trogir in December 1357 and also for a brief report on the rebellion in Šibenik in June 1358, see: Lucio, Memorie istoriche, 265–71; Lučić, Povijesna svjedočanstva, 596–607. The resolution of disagreements in Trogir was imposed through the intervention of the Ban John Csúz, Bećir, “Plemstvo,” 145–46. The situation in Šibenik had to be addressed by the new Ban Nicholas Szécsi. Klaić believes that the unrest in Šibenik was caused by conflicts between the pro-Hungarian or noble faction and the pro-Venice or popular faction, Klaić, Povijest Hrvata, 176. Of course, the question arises whether the case in Šibenik was truly a “class conflict” or if the common people were merely mobilized by one of the conflicting noble factions. The circumstances under which factional struggles in the local political scene are prone to escalation and the correlation of conflict intensity with the degree of influence of external political factors, as well as the events in the timeframe considered here, have been discussed in detail, for example, in the case of Trogir: Bećir, “Plemstvo,” 135–67.

  28. 28 The fear of the Dubrovnik authorities regarding the connection of its subjects with foreign rulers is evident in a series of regulations which, under the threat of severe penalties, prohibited individuals from accepting possessions, privileges, and titles from foreign political entities. Similar apprehension was expressed towards individuals who held high positions at foreign courts, Janeković Römer, Okvir slobode, 32–35, 87–88, 249; Janeković Römer, Višegradski ugovor, 102–3.

  29. 29 Šoštarić, “Dubrovački poklisari,” 173–75.

  30. 30 Janeković Römer, Višegradski ugovor, 103–8; Vekarić, Nevidljive pukotine, 54–56; Šoštarić, “Universitatis fidelium,”

  31. 31 SAD, Reformationes, ser. 2, vol. 18, f. 89r (23.8.1361); Gelcich, Monumenta Ragusina, vol. III, 114–15.

  32. 32 Concerning the royal knights emerging from the Zadar nobility, see: Grbavac, “Prilog”; Grbavac, “Zadarski plemići.” Regarding the circumstances and contacts through which the Zadar nobility established connections with representatives of royal authority in the prewar period, laying the groundwork for subsequent privileges, see: Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 87–97.

  33. 33 Li Zaratini, che avevano continua inclinazione verso il re d’ Ungaria, non volendo maneggiar il fatto con destrezza (come li Ragusei), s’ erano, la settima volta, alienati dai Veneziani, i quali però avevano mandato un grosso esercito per ricuperar quella città. Resti, Chronica Ragusina, 130.

  34. 34 Havrylyshyn and Srzentić, Economy of Ragusa, 22–23.

  35. 35 Medini, Dubrovnik Gučetića, 72–80; Mahnken, Dubrovački patricijat, 244–47; Janeković Römer, “Priznanje,” 296; Janeković Römer, Višegradski ugovor, 83, 145.

  36. 36 Janeković Römer, Višegradski ugovor, 83.

  37. 37 Here, we particularly mean the relative geographical proximity of the two opposing state centers, namely the fact that the Dalmatian cities were precisely the (albeit only one) battleground where Angevin and Venetian interests were in armed conflict. On the divergence of proclaimed war goals, mastery of Dalmatia, and those actually realized, see: Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat.”

  38. 38 The imposition of a new administrative system aimed at the systematic political demobilization of those members of the city nobility who had escaped deportation to Venice, Klaić and Petricioli, Zadar u srednjem vijeku, 311–12; Dokoza, “Struktura zadarske elite,” 138–40, 143–45. Despite the efforts of Venetian authorities, the exiled Zadar nobility played a significant role in the Angevin conquest of the city, as demonstrated by Ančić: Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 120–24.

  39. 39 Gruber, “Borba Ludovika I. s Mlečanima,” 130, 131.

  40. 40 Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 95–97. This certainly does not mean that Venetian rule did not have its supporters among the ranks of the Zadar nobility. For more or less certain Venetian adherents from the ranks of the Zadar elite, see: Dokoza, “Struktura zadarske elite,” 164–68.

  41. 41 The sequence of events is presented by Cutheis, a chronicler of Split, Lucii, De regno, 383; Rismondo, A Cutheis tabula, 196–98. Regarding the reasons for the rebellion, see: Lucio, Memorie istoriche, 255–56; Lučić, Povijesna svjedočanstva, 576–77; Novak, Povijest Splita I, 222; Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 107–8.

  42. 42 In the context of the study of emotions, especially with an understanding of emotions as cognitively staged information, it is revealing to consider the letter from Doge Giovanni Delfino, addressed to Split and Trogir on July 15, 1357, in which the Doge expressed his considerable dissatisfaction with their actions: “Audivimus non sine displicentia multa mentis, quod inter vos fuerunt aliqua novitates per quas comitem et gentes nostras licentiasse videmini”, Smičiklas, Diplomatički zbornik, vol. 12, 424, doc. 322. Lučić translates this as “great sorrow” (gran dispiacere), Lucio, Memorie istoriche, 258; Lučić, Povijesna svjedočanstva, 583, while Novak mentions “great discomfort,” Novak, Povijest Splita I, 226. Regardless of the exact translation, it is evident that the Doge, ultimately unsuccessfully, tries to harness emotions to achieve a specific goal: the return of the two communes under the protection of Venice. This interpretation finds support in the concluding words of the letter, which strive to evoke an emotional atmosphere by drawing associations with family relations: “quam paratam et promptam remissa qualibet iniura vobis offermius cim firmo porposito vos habendi carissimos et recommendatos sicut unquam habimus et vestram consercationem et bonum cordialiter ac totius viribus procurandi ac personas et bona nostra pro vobis,sicut bonus pater facit pro filiis liberaliter exponere.” Smičiklas, Diplomatički zbornik, vol. 12, 425, doc. 322.

  43. 43 “In signum gaudii et honoris magnificentis domini nostri domini regis et pro honore comunis Spaleti.” Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 166, no. 86. Although not particularly significant in concrete actions, the session mentioned still offers an example of a case in which the affective state could not be completely suppressed and spilled over into open expression of emotion, which, moreover, was attributed to otherwise formal expressions preserved in the records of the Grand Council.

  44. 44 Decisions concerning funds for municipal expenses were often the subject of sessions of the Grand Council. The podestà Gentilis, shortly after the events described here, claimed that the municipal treasury was empty, Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 168, no. 89.

  45. 45 On the campaign and the crimes committed by the people of Šibenik, together with the Venetians, against the inhabitants of Šolta, see: Lucii, De regno, 383; Rismondo, A Cutheis tabula, 198. The case of Šibenik, or the anti-Venetian uprising that occurred there at the end of 1357, clearly illustrates the correlation between emotions and practical actions in immediate reality. Seeking to preventively avoid a repetition of the events in Split and Trogir, the Venetian authorities took certain violent measures against the inhabitants of Šibenik. Contrary to the desired outcome, these acts caused widespread dissatisfaction and prompted a general uprising among the commoners, likely channeled by pro-Angevin-oriented individuals, Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 111–12. Without delving into a closer identification of the supporters of royal authority in the city itself, the course of events in Šibenik suggest that certain actions by the political actors were indeed motivated by or at the very least occurred under significant influence of emotional states and did not exclusively unfold within the domain of some municipal Realpolitik.

  46. 46 If anyone among the Split elite did in fact entertain the said notion, it ultimately proved to be true. In addition to the significance of Zadar from the perspective of the strategic concepts of the Venetian side, it is also worth mentioning the thesis of M. Ančić about Zadar as a key objective in the eyes of the royal forces: Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothat,” 97. The loss of Zadar was a matter of great distress for the Venetian authorities, as evidenced by the fate of the Venetian count of Zadar at the moment of its fall (or liberation), Michele Faliero. Shortly after the war, the now former count of Zadar was punished in Venice with imprisonment and loss of all honors, as well as the loss of the right to participate in public administration, Gruber, “Borba Ludovika I. s Mlečanima,” 149–50.

  47. 47 According to chronicler Cutheis, the coup in Split was undertaken by “all the nobles and many commoners of the city of Split” (“omnes nobiles et plures populares Civitatis Spaleti”), Lucii, De regno, 383; Rismondo, A Cutheis tabula, 197. Although the endeavor is portrayed as the result of a singular purpose on the part of the Split noblemen, it is highly unlikely that this was truly the case and that the Venetian authorities had no support among the city elite. Doubts about the narrative of the Split chronicler are also put forward by: Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 108–10.

  48. 48 Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 167, no. 88. The seemingly calmer and more rational approach of the council in the case of the ban’s emissary can also be interpreted in another way. In addition to the incoming news (which was already known), the initiative for rewarding the messenger now came from the representative of the central government, meaning that it was practically imposed both by words and by the reputation of the original sender. Despite dealing with the emissary from the highest representative of royal power in the region, the noblemen of Split found it appropriate to weigh the practicality of the ban’s request against the state of the city’s coffers. It can be seen as ironic that the proposal for frugality in fulfilling the ban’s wishes came from Kamurcije Franjin, one of the economically most powerful members of the Split nobility. During a later dispute with the Split commune, Kamurcije used the right of appeal to that same royal authority on whose representative’s endowment he had proposed limitations. A concise overview of Kamurcije Franjin’s political and economic activities can be found in: Raukar, Studije o Dalmaciji, 257–58.

  49. 49 Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 243, no. 200.

  50. 50 The extent to which the Angevin approach to governing Dalmatia is truly innovative, as opposed to representing continuity with the political system of the preceding Arpadović dynasty, is clearly indicated by: Klaić and Petricioli, Zadar u srednjem vijeku, 327; Klaić, Povijest Hrvata, 631. Regarding the modalities of governance over annexed territories in pre-modern societies, see: Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” 48–71.

  51. 51 Under Angevin rule, Zadar would come to enjoy a dominant position among the Dalmatian cities, Klaić and Petricioli, Zadar u srednjem vijeku, 330–32. Apart from its unique judicial status regarding its internal affairs, which can be observed in the authority enjoyed by the city’s rectors, the nobility of Zadar would play an important role in the royal administration of the province. On the “duality of rule” in Zadar, see: Klaić and Petricioli, Zadar u srednjem vijeku, 335; Klaić, Povijest Hrvata, 629; Popić, Krojenje pravde, 10. On the role of Zadar noblemen in the royal administration, see: Grbavac, “Zadarski plemići.”

  52. 52 During the meeting in July 1358, the podestà of Split, Gentilis, informed the Great Council that the royal representatives in Dalmatia had requested his departure, Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 199–200, no. 133. In August of the same year, Gentilis requested his resignation from the position of podestà before the council, citing “legitimate reasons,” Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 206, no. 143. The Angevin concept of governance over Dalmatian cities is reflected in the verdict of the Ban John Csúz given in the city of Trogir in August 1358, as emphasized by Nada Klaić: Klaić, Povijest Hrvata, 629. Regulating the agitated relations inside the Trogir commune, the verdict stated that: “quia nullus potest ese in civitatibus Dalmatie potestas vel capitaneus, nisi de voluntate regia et de eius commissione.” Smičiklas, Diplomatički zbornik, vol. 12, 506–7, doc. 390. Lučić included the verdict in his history of Trogir in: Lucio, Memorie istoriche, 268–69; Lučić, Povijesna svjedočanstva, 601–3.

  53. 53 In December 1358, Split delegates found themselves in front of the count of Trogir, Franjo de Georgis, where they challenged his and, therefore, royal jurisdiction over a legal dispute initiated by Kamurcije Franjo, a nobleman of Split. Kamurcije’s case eventually turned into a legal tangle and remained a subject of argument before the royal court of law as late as June 1359, Gruber, “Dalmacija za Ludo­vika I. (1358–1382),” 200–3; Novak, Povijest Splita I, 249–50, 251.

  54. 54 Emotional states, considered here as one of the possible origins of later concrete political actions, have been observed in earlier historiography dedicated to this period. G. Novak states that there was “great discontent” in Split, prompted by Louis’ restriction of Split’s autonomy, Novak, Povijest Splita I, 53. D. Gruber also states that the measures taken by the Angevin Crown, this time in the form of an appeal letter from Franjo de Georgis to the Split commune regarding the complaint of Split citizen Kamurcije Franjin, had “greatly angered” the people of Split, Gruber, “Dalmacija za Ludovika I. (1358–1382),” 201. A certain methodological restraint is necessary, however, when interpreting the unexpressed emotional states of past historical actors, particularly when making claims about such strong convictions. That being said, the indication that there was indeed some dissatisfaction with the previous actions of the central government in the new province can be gleaned from the document we cite in the immediate continuation of the paper.

  55. 55 “In quarum gratiarum et ordinum presentium et retractationem gravaminum predictorum.” Smičiklas, Diplomatički zbornik, vol. 12, 592, doc. 443. Lučić included the charter in his history of Trogir in: Lucio, Memorie istoriche, 273–75; Lučić, Povijesna svjedočanstva, 611–15.

  56. 56 Lučić emphasizes the poor quality of local salt, Lucio, Memorie istoriche, 275; Lučić, Povijesna svje­do­čanstva, 615.

  57. 57 D. Gruber primarily interprets dissatisfaction as expressed in the complaints made in the Dalmatian cities from the perspective of administrative changes, Gruber, “Dalmacija za Ludovika I. (1358–1382),” 199–200. The severity of the new royal fiscal policy in Dalmatia is colorfully illustrated by the words of Venetian envoy Bartolomeo Ursio. In a report about his diplomatic activities in Dalmatia in 1360, Ursio stated that the conditions were so dire that the people “don’t even dare show anything beautiful that they have, if they have any such thing.” Ljubić, Listine, vol. 4, 20, no. 43. Novak, Povijest Splita I, 254.

  58. 58 The provision stated that, after the investigation was concluded, the punishment should be assigned, among other things, according to the status of the person who committed the crime (“et inuentos culpabiles punire et condemnare secundum formam statuti et ultra formam statuti inspecta conditione, persona et qualitate delicti.” Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća: 243, no. 200). This paragraph suggests that the composition of the group of conspirators was diverse, or at the very least, included individuals whose social position could not be assessed en masse. By translating the final part of the here cited text “conditione, persona et qualitate delicti” as “position of the person and the crime he committed,” G. Novak seemingly draws the same conclusions. Referring to the session of the Grand Council held on July 15, 1359, where a three-member committee with relatively broad powers was voted in, the author, concluded, quite euphemistically compared to his previous statements about the emotional states of the populace of Split, that “at that time, Split found itself in trouble,” Novak, Povijest Splita I, 253. The record of the session of the Grand Council from July 15, in which a three-member committee practically received free rein in their actions, can be further analyzed. Radical decisions by the Grand Council were likely elicited by both fear and uncertainty due to the incomplete knowledge of the full extent of the uncovered conspiracy, Stipišić and Šamšalović, Zapisnici Velikog vijeća, 243–44, no. 201.

  59. 59 This is implied by: Novak, Povijest Splita I, 253. It is important, once again, to bring attention to the aforementioned narrative presented by Cutheis, according to whom the initial revolt of 1357 was the result of consensus (which in reality would have been extremely unlikely) among the noble families of Split. As pointed out by M. Ančić, the narrative of the Split chronicler likely represents an “urban legend.” Being somewhat akin to a medieval “official version of events,” the narrative sought to emphasize the collective nature of the actions of the local elite while reducing the role of the actual leaders of the endeavor, Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 108–9. Therefore, it is worth noting the possibility that the aforementioned “official version” of the coup may have also sought to diminish in the collective memory the almost certain existence of members of the local elite who remained loyal to the Venetian authorities.

  60. 60 The circumstances and factional background of the rebellion in Trogir are thoroughly analyzed by: Bećir, “Plemstvo,” 135–67.

  61. 61 Here we will, once again, draw attention to the perspectives of M. Ančić, who questions the veracity of Cutheis’ claims. In doing so, we steer his considerations in a different direction. While examining the collective nature of the upheaval, Ančić warns of a series of decisions made by the Great Council that aimed to regulate communication between the members of the Split commune and the royal authorities, Ančić, “Rat kao organizirani društveni pothvat,” 108–109. In addition to offering a compelling indication of the presence of prominent leaders of the royal party within the city itself, the progressively stricter penalties for unsanctioned communication with representatives of central authority can be contextualized as a reflection of the, as previously witnessed in the case of Dubrovnik, suspicions and fears of the municipal authorities concerning private individuals and their potential for acquiring personal gain by establishing reciprocal relationships with the sovereign.

  62. 62 Raukar, “Hrvatska u kasnom srednjem vijeku,” 321; Raukar, Hrvatsko srednjovjekovlje, 86; Raukar, “Hrvatske zemlje,” 32.

  63. 63 Dinić, Odluke veća, 145, 258–60, 273.

  64. 64 Ibid., 295; For comparison, see: Ančić, Putanja klatna, 208.

  65. 65 Resti, Chronica Ragusina, 171; Ćirković, Istorija, 148–51; Foretić, “Godina 1358,” 268; Ančić, Putanja klatna, 203, 209–18.

  66. 66 “Prima pars est de faciendo unionem cum comune et civitate Jadre et cum omnibus aliis civitatibus de Dalmacia, cum modis et pactis infrascriptis, videlicet: quod nos sumus parati, dispositi et contenti supra dictam ligam et unionem cum civitate Jadre et cum aliis civitatibus Dalmacie, prout ipse ambassiator nos requisivit, contra Venecias; si ipsa civitas Veneciarum oppresserit vel ad opprimendum venerit aliquam ex civitatibus Dalmacie, quod nos omnes civitates Dalmacie teneremur una aliam adiuvare. Et quod in presenti liga et unione comprehendantur omnes nostri cirumvicini de terra firma, quod contra eos facta liga ipsa intelligatur, cui civitatem nostram opprimere vellent.” October 22, 1382. Dinić, Odluke veća, 262–63.

  67. 67 Dinić, Odluke veća, 262–63; Gelcich and Thallóczy, Diplomatarium, 701–2; Resti, Chronica Ragusina, 170; Matković, “Prilozi,” 209; Foretić, Povijest Dubrovnika, 164; Raukar, Zadar u XV. stoljeću, 32; Raukar, Hrvatsko srednjovjekovlje: 86; Ančić, Putanja klatna, 208–9.

  68. 68 “Iuravimu invicem et visissim unitatem, fraternitatem et amicitiam perpetuam et iuavare alter alteri toto posse et scitu, semper in fidelitate et fidei constantia dominarum nostrarum reginarum et sacrae coronae ungariae.” Šišić, “Memoriale,” 5–6. N. Klaić points out the interesting emphasis on the loyalty to both queens, Klaić, Povijest Hrvata, 655.

  69. 69 The king himself halted the diplomatic initiative of Dubrovnik at the beginning of 1358, directed at other Dalmatian cities with the goal of preserving their recently acquired freedom. D. Gruber interprets this royal action as a result of Louis’ mistrust and, in particular, the king’s fear that such an alliance of cities would likely restrict royal rights in the newly acquired province. Gruber, “Dalmacija za Ludovika I.,” 172–73.

  70. 70 Queen Elizabeth had sent her envoy John Besenyő to the Dalmatian cities, who was then received by the Zadar commune, Kostrenčić, Diplomatički zbornik, vol. 16, 324, doc. 259, 330, doc. 263. The citizens of Zadar took an oath of fealty before the queen’s envoys, Kostrenčić, Diplomatički zbornik, 344–45, doc. 273; Šišić, “Memoriale,” 6. Both the queen mother Elizabeth and the junior queen Maria arrived in Zadar in October of 1383, Šišić, “Memoriale,” 6. The arrival of the queens can certainly be put into the context of the already active rebellious activities in the nearby fort of Vrana. Klaić, Povijest Hrvata, 655–56.

  71. 71 The exceptional position of Zadar and its nobility within the Angevin politics in the province, as well as the proximity of the rebels in Vrana, should not be dismissed as a significant differentiating factor in determining the mood within the city itself, as well as in its comparison with and potential extrapolation to other Dalmatian municipal centers.

  72. 72 Šišić, “Memoriale,” 8–9. Problematizing this case, N. Klaić asserted that the reason for the growing dissatisfaction in Zadar should be sought in the absence of privileges granted by the two queens during their stay. According to Klaić, the people of Zadar, who simultaneously inherited close ties with Charles of Durazzo, were disappointed by the lack of the clearly expressed favor of the new rulers, Klaić and Petricioli, Zadar u srednjem vijeku, 355. Apart from this disruption of the delicate balance between the center and the periphery of the kingdom, in order to understand the dissatisfaction and particularly the uncertainty in the new political order, it is important to consider the mental landscape of that time. Namely, the coronation of Mary in 1382 represents a rare example of a woman ascending to the Hungarian throne. The fact that Mary was officially crowned “rex Hungariae” also indicates the extent to which the aforementioned course of events constituted an anomaly for the milieu in question: Bak, “Roles and Functions of Queens,” 21.

  73. 73 The gravity of this information, that is, the importance of the fact that the rebellion against the Angevin ruling house was emerging precisely in Zadar, becomes even more apparent when we consider not only the position of the city under Angevin rule but also the length of the relationship between Zadar and the Angevin dynasty. A brief overview of the connections between Zadar and the Angevins can be found in: E. Peričić, “Zadar u doba prvih veza s Anžuvincima.”