The Influence of Adam Czartoryski’s Foreign Policy Thinking and 
Agent Network on National Movements in Serbia and Bulgaria*

Katalin Schrek

University of Debrecen

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 Hungarian Historical Review Volume 15 Issue 2 (2026): 188-220 DOI 10.38145/2026.2.188

Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861), a leading Polish political emigrant and scion of one of Poland’s foremost aristocratic families (who even held the hereditary title of prince), recognized early in the nineteenth century that the survival of Central and South­eastern Europe’s small states depended on regional cooperation, especially considering the geopolitical pressures of the Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman Empires. His view of politics was strongly influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution, his time in Russian service, and the lessons of the Polish uprising of 1830–1831. He established the Hôtel Lambert in Paris as the political and organizational center of his activity, and over the course of the 1830s and 1840s, Czartoryski built up an extensive international network, which was also very active in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Peninsula.

The network, which consisted of political émigrés, intellectuals, former military officers, and experienced diplomats, provided support to the Balkan national movements fighting for independence. It operated mainly from Constantinople and Belgrade and sought to promote political cooperation in the Balkans. The aim was to strengthen national ideologies and weaken the influence of regional powers, most importantly the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire. The purpose of the efforts of Czartoryski’s network in Serbia was to stabilize and strengthen the internal political system. In Bulgaria, the network focused primarily on supporting the movement for the establishment of an independent Orthodox Church and the Uniate Church. The discussion below examines the changes in Czartoryski’s thinking about international relations and the regionally differing mechanisms of his network of agents in the Balkan Peninsula, as well as the long-term effects of the efforts of this network on Balkan national movements.

Keywords: Czartoryski agents, diplomacy, Balkan Peninsula, nineteenth century, geo­political strategy, Balkan national movements

In historical works dealing with international relations, the nineteenth century is typically presented as the era of classical diplomacy. At that time, the formal framework for shaping interstate relations was based on international legal regulations and mutually accepted conditions. European states and great powers were able to represent their positions through institutionalized foreign ministries and their associated systems of foreign representation. At the same time, foreign policy and diplomatic activity underwent changes, particularly in the fields of information gathering and relationship building and networking. The use of actors operating outside the official sphere as instruments to collect information and exert some influence gradually gained importance, appearing in various forms across Central and Southeastern Europe. A paradigmatic example of this phe­nomenon was the agent network organized by Adam Czartoryski, which began operating in the 1830s and 1840s. With its systematically developed contacts, this network was active not only in Central and Eastern Europe but also in the Balkan Peninsula and Anatolia. The present study aims to examine the development of this agent network, the mechanisms of its operation, and its long-term effects, which extended far beyond Czartoryski’s own activities.

The study of the Czartoryski network is important because this network represented a different model of foreign policy and information gathering in the nineteenth century. It was a specific kind of network, based on knowledge transfer, in which non-state actors could have a sizable impact on regional political actors, especially in the Balkan Peninsula.

Adam Czartoryski: A Pioneer of a New Type of Informal Diplomacy

The establishment of the Czartoryski network was driven by several factors, which can only be comprehended against the backdrop of Adam Czartoryski’s earlier activity and the evolution of his political thought. His experience in foreign policy, dating back several decades, and his extensive network of international connections, which extended across Europe, formed the foundation for his network of diplomatic agents. These experiences did not merely provide him with a substantial foundation of knowledge. They also instilled in him a keen awareness of the disillusioning realities of high politics and diplomacy. As a member of one of the most prominent Polish noble families, Czartoryski was acutely aware of his responsibility to restore Polish independence. Following the third partition of Poland in 1795, Czartoryski, who had found his way to the Russian Empire, was able to gain significant influence at the court in St. Peters­burg. He became a member of the circle of young noble intellectuals known as the “young friends,” which gathered around the Russian heir to the throne, the future Tsar Alexander I (1801–1825). As a result, he was given a political position in the Russian government after 1801. Initially, he became a member of the Secret Council, which essentially functioned as a political advisory board and informally assisted the ruler in decision-making. Subsequently, he assumed the position of deputy foreign minister, and a few years later, from 1804, he assumed the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1

This career path was considered unconventional for a Polish nobleman, and consequently, Czartoryski faced significant criticism from his Russian con­temporaries.2 Some members of the conservative Russian nobility explicitly disapproved of Tsar Alexander I’s appointment of a prince of Polish descent to such high government positions. However, the fact that Czartoryski was a person of outstanding abilities and that, through his family, he had an extensive network of international connections, combined with his cosmopolitan mindset and broad education, also played a role in the tsar’s decision. Czartoryski’s European travels, his studies at the University of Edinburgh, and his language skills all left him well suited to a prominent role in foreign affairs.3

Despite the brevity of his career in foreign diplomacy, Czartoryski remained in the service of the St. Petersburg court for a considerable period, as he believed that progress in the Polish cause could only be achieved by obtaining the support of the Russian Empire. He sought to create opportunities for the revival of the Polish state by devising various plans and foreign policy strategies. In developing his concept, he proposed an alternative that would appeal to the tsarist government and convince it to create an independent Polish state, while taking into account the foreign policy ambitions of the Russian Empire.4 In addition to the reorganization of Eastern Europe, Czartoryski sought opportunities for cooperation with the Balkan Peninsula, as a geopolitically important region, early in his political career. The foundational principles for this theoretical frame­work were first established in Czartoryski’s initial memoranda between 1803 and

1806.5 At that time, Czartoryski also recognized the importance of the Balkans, albeit in a different way than he had in the 1840s. At the beginning of his career, the international environment was completely different, and he had had to develop his ideas in the context of French expansion and the Napoleonic Wars. During this period, Russia had played a central role in his ideas. However, this approach underwent a significant change in the 1810s and 1820s, when new influences impacted Czartoryski’s way of thinking. His optimistic expectations leading up to the Congress of Vienna turned into serious disappointment when the question of restoring an independent Poland was not brought to the table. In fact, Russia extended its power over even more Polish territory. Although Tsar Alexander I granted Congress Poland a constitution in 1815, along with economic advantages within the Russian Empire, these measures did not con­tribute to the formation of an independent Poland.6

Czartoryski and Capodistrias: Discussions and Ideas about Russia

However, after the Congress of Vienna, which for Czartoryski was a devastating disappointment, the Polish prince concluded that without great power (Russian) support, there was no chance for change. There were significant parallels between his thinking and the ideas of Ioannis Capodistrias. Capodistrias was a con­temporary of Czartoryski. He was also active alongside him at the St. Petersburg court. Capodistrias, who was of Greek origin, had a career very similar to that of Czartoryski. A nobleman from Corfu, he arrived in Russia after the fall of the Septinsular Republic (1800–1807), where he quickly joined the Foreign Ministry,

thanks in no small part to his good diplomatic relations.7 Initially a diplomat, Capodistrias also served as foreign minister in St. Petersburg between 1814 and 1822. Like Czartoryski, he wanted to advance the cause of national independence for his homeland, specifically the creation of an independent Greek state. Capodistrias also viewed his service to the Russian Empire as a springboard for efforts to achieve this goal.8 They both came from aristocratic families and felt a sense of responsibility for the plights of their respective nations, and they used their political careers and positions in the Russian Empire to serve the national cause. As contemporary diplomat Philipp von Neumann9 noted,

Count Capodistrias seems to be a well-informed man; he has studied men and affairs; but he is rather a philosopher than a statesman, with particularly liberal and constitutional ideas. He sympathizes with the sentiments of the age without going so far as to agree with its errors.10

Capodistrias was criticized for his idealism and his commitment to liberal ideas, which made him an outsider among the ministers of the Russian Empire, just as Czartoryski had been before him.

Earlier, Adam Czartoryski had believed that the restoration of the Polish state could only be achieved with Russia’s support.11 Capodistrias held similar views regarding the establishment of the Greek state. Their parallel views crossed paths in Genoa in 1824, where they met and discussed their ideas. It was at this time that the ideas of the two men bore the most striking affinities. As Polish economist and historian W. H. Zawadski wrote in his work on Czartoryski,

Emperor Alexander’s two most gifted former foreign ministers, both advocates of constitutional government and of a moralistic inter­national order and both victims of the conservative shift in Alex­­ander’s policies in the early 1820’s, now found themselves collaborating as private persons in support of a cause their master had disavowed.12

Adam Czartoryski found an inspiring milieu in Italy, where he became a lead­ing supporter of the Philhellenic movement, which was spreading across Europe at the time. During this period, he wrote his most influential political treatise, Essai sur la diplomatie ou Manuscrit d’un Philhellène.

Viktor Taki drew attention to the fact that, despite certain common characteristics, there were significant differences between the two personalities in their ways of thinking. Although Capodistrias had previously disagreed with and criticized the Russian ruler, he adopted a pro-Russian stance when he saw an opportunity to establish Greek independence after 1827.13 Czartoryski, however, kept his distance from Russia in the 1820s and, after the Polish uprising of 1830–1831, he consistently maintained his anti-Russian position.14 Russia’s behavior in the Greek War of Independence was significantly influenced by changes in the international situation, and the same could be observed in the Polish question. The major difference between the two national movements was that the separation of Greek territories from the Ottoman Empire and their subsequent independence would create a favorable geopolitical situation for Russia. It would weaken the government in Constantinople in Southeastern Europe while strengthening St. Petersburg’s influence in the same region. The Polish issue, on the other hand, would have required the tsarist government to alter its own imperial framework and territorial relations, and this gave the Polish question an entirely different dimension. Although Russia supported the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1830,15 the Warsaw Uprising, which broke out in the same year, and the subsequent war of independence prompted full-scale Russian military intervention, first under the command of Ivan Iva­no­vich Diebitsch and then, after Diebitsch died of cholera, under Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich, who had returned from the Caucasian front to suppress the Polish uprising.16 These two cases clearly illustrate the strategic importance and diversity of the eastern and southeastern European regions, as well as the stark contrast in Russian political approaches toward them. It is perhaps here that we can locate the conceptual foundations on which Czartoryski wanted to base his post-1831 policy.

The desire for independence among the Balkan peoples was no different to the aspirations of the Poles. The key question in both cases was therefore how to achieve national sovereignty and what role Russia and the other great powers would play in this process. For Czartoryski, the answer was clear: following the failure of the Polish struggle for independence, the idea of Russia playing any part in the creation of Poland was unacceptable. An independent Polish state could only be created in opposition to Russia. But what was the alternative for the Balkan peoples, where the Russian government could facilitate their separation from the Ottoman Empire? The answer, according to Czartoryski, was the same: the peoples living under Ottoman rule must first become a nation and then a nation-state, but without Russia’s involvement.

Essai sur la diplomatie and the Problem of Small States

In his ambitious work, Czartoryski, inspired in part by his meeting with Capodistrias and his experiences in Italy in the 1820s, reconsidered his views on European diplomacy and interstate relations. As he states in the introduction, the book is divided into three parts: “in the first, I observe diplomacy as it is; in the second, I consider it as it should be; in the third, I examine the means of bringing it back to its true purpose.”17 In the essay, Czartoryski examines the nature of diplomacy from various angles. This is particularly interesting when we consider how he later organized his informal diplomatic network. Czartoryski delivers a strong critique of diplomacy, highlighting its negative practices and inability to bring about change. Diplomacy, he insists, shows no significant progress or development (unlike other fields of science) in either theory or practice:

Diplomacy, marked by this sign of original sin, from which it has not yet been able to cleanse itself, has been trapped for centuries in a vicious circle, a fertile source of confusion and ever-renewed calamities, from which it will only escape by ceasing to believe itself to be outside the bounds of justice and morality.18

He emphasized his observations in relation to the diplomatic process in general, as well as the diplomatic profession itself. “Saying that someone is a diplomat,” he contends, “is not considered praise by anyone.”19 The most important element missing from diplomacy, in Czartoryski’s assessment, is moral sense.

As part of a comprehensive historical analysis (a kind of revue historique), Czartoryski presents his insights and proposals, examining diplomatic tools and methods from ancient times to the end of the eighteenth century. He begins with Greek and Roman civilization and then moves on to the Middle Ages and the early modern period. He considers the Peace of Westphalia to be an important milestone, as it provided a solid foundation for the stability of European interstate relations, or, as he put it, for maintaining the European balance of power. Czartoryski applied the critical approach outlined in Essai sur la diplomatie to the problems of his own time. The Congress of Vienna failed to meet expectations and objectives, and the Holy Alliance, formed as a result of negotiations among the great powers, symbolizes the misguided nature of the efforts to consolidate old power structures and habits20 instead of creating a new Europe based on new principles.

The principles whose influence had given such noble impetus to the nations, and which had contributed so greatly to the success of the coalition, appeared in a different light to the victors (…) The diplomats of all the congresses, beginning with that of Vienna, rarely sought to combine utility with justice.21

The way international decisions are made, Czartoryski insists, must change, because decisions based on injustice can never benefit the greater political good.22

In the post-1815 system, the great powers continued to assert their right to influence international relations and the futures of specific regions. Small states, in the meantime, continued to be marginalized, which is one of the most important points of Czartoryski’s essay. The real novelty of his ideas was his recognition of the importance of small states and his emphasis on their ability to create a genuine balance of power. He explained that, although the European great powers have different characteristics, they are all equally powerful and none is stronger or more influential than the others. This means that the role of small states was becoming increasingly important, because they could actually decide important issues and thus create or modify a real balance of power. However, this was only possible if the great powers regarded them as partners and not subordinate states.23 The concept of small statehood was also pivotal in Czartoryski’s thinking, forming the foundation of his endeavors from the 1840s onwards and his Balkan policy. This policy emphasized the formation of regional nation states and encouraged cooperation among them. It is important to note at this point that, as in Czartoryski’s 1806 draft,24 the concept of federation appeared in Essai sur la diplomatie as a significant and feasible form of cooperation among small states.25

The Rising Importance of the Balkans

Czartoryski’s criticism of the 1815 system and his skepticism regarding traditional great power politics are captured well in his Essai sur la diplomatie. In this respect, Czartoryski’s thinking underwent a significant change in the 1820s. He no longer believed that empires could be relied on to provide protection, as this strategy itself increasingly served the great powers’ ambitions for further territorial expansion. New solutions were needed that offered small states some degree of independence, and Czartoryski sought to enhance the significance of South­eastern Europe and the nation states (small states) of the region. This required the development of new diplomatic tools and the strengthening of informal processes and networks.

Following the defeat of the Polish uprising of 1830–1831, Czartoryski began building a network that could play a role in European international relations. One must keep in mind that the Polish émigré community was not entirely aligned with Czartoryski’s movement. Polish émigrés in Europe were divided into three main political factions with completely different concepts.

Two organizations, the Polish National Committee and the Polish Democratic Society, represented republican ideas and advocated the creation of an in­de­pendent Polish state. In contrast, the movement led by Czartoryski was fundamentally characterized by a monarchist standpoint.26 Therefore, the network of the Paris-based Hôtel Lambert was only one of several Polish émigré communities, and even the people who belonged to this circle held sometimes strikingly different views.27

Czartoryski initially aimed to strengthen Ottoman–Polish relations (1831–1833), but his later attention turned to the Balkan provinces, where political forces seeking to establish nation states were very active. Believing that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, Czartoryski accepted that small Balkan states would soon emerge in the region.28 At the same time, in the early 1830s, cooperation seemed a reasonable option for both the Porte and Czartoryski, as they were both driven by anti-Russian sentiment.29

After the failure of the Polish question, Czartoryski’s initial goal was to strengthen political ties with France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire.30 However, this process was turbulent in the 1830s. Cooperation with Con­stantinople started with great enthusiasm after 1831 but then slowed down or changed as international relations shifted. Such situations arose after the two Egyptian crises. During the first Egyptian campaign of Muhammad Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, the Russian Empire unexpectedly became an ally of the Ottoman Empire. This resulted in the signing of the Russian-Turkish defense treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833.31 The Porte’s sudden orientation towards Russia was completely unacceptable to Czartoryski. The second Egyptian crisis was resolved within the framework of the European concert at the London Conference of 1840–1841. However, a temporary compromise was also reached at that time between Russia and Great Britain, which had previously clashed with Russia over several issues, especially regarding the Turkish straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. The change in British attitude towards Russia and the loss of position of the French, whom the Polish strategy relied on, also prompted Czartoryski to reconsider his approach.32

Following these developments, a turning point occurred in the activity of the Polish network and in the diplomatic tools they employed after 1841.33 Czartoryski devoted a significant part of his foreign-policy efforts to a new region: the Balkan Peninsula. While the idea of preserving the Ottoman Empire (and thus also preserving its territorial integrity) remained important to Czartoryski, he also became fully committed to the idea of supporting the emergence of Balkan nation states. As Robert A. Berry has emphasized, “Czartoryski saw no contradiction between the ideas of nationalism and the preservation of the Ottoman state.”34 The contradiction was resolved by Czartoryski’s conviction that the Ottoman Empire could provide a framework for the Balkan peoples in which they could gradually strengthen their national consciousness and progress towards complete independence, while cooperating with the Porte.35 At the same time, Czartoryski sought to strengthen Polish-Ottoman cooperation. He tried to persuade the government in Constantinople that granting greater rights and autonomy to the Balkan provinces would enhance regional security and protect the Ottoman Empire from Russian influence.36 In this regard, Czartoryski’s way of thinking was very similar to the argument he had used regarding Poland at the beginning of his career as Russian Foreign Minister. At that time, he had tried to convince the Russian government that restoring Poland would strengthen the defense of the Russian Empire’s European borders. He was attempting to garner the support of tsarist diplomacy for the Polish cause by presenting Polish independence as a vital Russian interest. In the 1830s, he tried to persuade the Ottoman Empire to support the autonomy of the Balkan peoples to counterbalance Russian influence in the region. In both cases, Czartoryski used foreign policy arguments to convince the Russian and Ottoman governments to adopt policies that seemingly contradicted their own interests.

Czartoryski’s network changed in many respects. Relations with the Porte were elevated to a new level with the establishment of a permanent Polish mission. In 1841, Michał Czajkowski37 founded the Eastern Agency in Con­stanti­nople, which coordinated Polish-Ottoman relations and the activities of Polish agents in the Balkans.38 Czajkowski’s work was so effective and professional that it attracted the attention of Russian diplomats and the secret police.39 At the same time, the Czartoryski network began to pursue a more intensive policy in the Peninsula. This strategy required sending agents to Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Danubian Principalities to acquire knowledge, gain insight into public sentiment, and establish cooperation with the local political elites. France also provided Czartoryski with substantial assistance in establishing his political network in Southeastern Europe. Almost all his agents traveled through Ottoman territory on French passports. As a result, the Polish project had to harmonize, at least to some extent, with French foreign-policy interests, since the two were closely intertwined in the Balkan region.40

This study does not aim to analyze the actions of individual agents in detail. Rather, it concentrates on the possibilities for implementing Czartoryski’s political ideas by examining two Balkan provinces: Serbia and Bulgaria. I chose these areas because they clearly demonstrate how the advocates of Polish interests adapted to the local political culture and mentality of the Balkan Peninsula. They also offer revealing case studies that shed light on the op­portunities available for supporting the aspirations of smaller states in the region. Moreover, they highlight the differences in the methods used by the different political actors who sought to nurture political and ecclesiastical nationalism during this period and the different outcomes with which their efforts met.

Serbia: Supporting Political Movement

The Czartoryski network began its activities in Serbia in the 1840s. During Miloš Obrenović’s reign (1815–1840), Serbia’s domestic and foreign policies were subject to complex political maneuvering, reflecting the frequent changes in Serbian-Ottoman-Russian relations. The Serbian Principality’s autonomy was secured through the Serbian-Ottoman Treaty of 1830, the demarcation of the Serbian-Ottoman border in 1833, and the introduction of a constitution in 1838. These events laid the political foundations for the modern Serbian state.41 The difficulties of this process, coupled with the absolute nature of Miloš Obrenović’s rule and his drastic methods of dealing with his opponents, made the Serbian political scene unpredictable for a long time. Debates over the constitution and methods of governance ultimately led to Obrenović’s abdication in 1839. Following the frequent changes of throne involving Milan and Mihailo, as well as the emergence of a new political movement to defend the constitution,42 the rule of the Obrenovićs family in Serbia came to an end in 1842.

Alexander (1842–1868), a member of the Karađorđe family, became the new leader of the Principality. During his reign, the country experienced a period of consolidation and reform. At this time, the activities of Polish émigré agents in Serbia increased, and František Zach began working to forge links between the Serbian political elite and Polish émigré communities.43 Russia’s strategy in Serbia differed considerably from its policies in the Eastern Balkan provinces. Unlike in the Danubian Principalities, the Russian government had no significant economic interests in Serbia, so it could not rely on economic expansion.44 Attempts had already been made to reduce Russian influence during the reign of Miloš Obrenović, primarily through British diplomacy. The new government’s even greater commitment to this approach created new opportunities for Polish émigrés and encouraged Czartoryski himself to become more active. The arrival of a new agent in Belgrade, the Czech František Zach, provided fresh impetus for the network’s activities in Serbia.45

The Serbian political crisis altered Czartoryski’s views on Serbia. Since the change of dynasty also meant a change in political direction, the new situation required a revised approach. Czartoryski’s political concept was centered on opposition to the Russian Empire. Indeed, the policy of Alexander Karađorđević and his supporters was fundamentally based on strong anti-Russian sentiment,46 fueled by frustration with the Russian government’s attempts to interfere in Serbian affairs. 47 In his 1843 work Conseils sur la conduite à suivre par la Serbie,48 Czartoryski recommended a comprehensive program of foreign policies for the Principality, focusing on maintaining relations with the European great powers, the neighboring states, and the peoples of the Balkans, a strategy that Serbia could use to increase its regional influence and move towards complete sovereignty.

Suggestions on internal policy can be divided into two major topics, which are as follows: 1) state administration and defense and 2) education and culture. According to Czartoryski, domestic political consolidation and unity were the most urgent goals for Serbia, an argument in support of which he needed merely refer to the recent political crisis. Following the coup of 1842, it was essential to consolidate power. Domestic political stability could be ensured through reconciliation between political factions and the establishment of a hereditary ruling dynasty.49

In terms of defense, Czartoryski thought it important to set up a Serbian national army and a training system for officers (by setting up a military school). In this respect, the Belgrade government could rely on Polish assistance and the experience of émigré officers.50 Another important aspect of Serbia’s self-defense strategy was negotiating with the Porte regarding the withdrawal of Ottoman garrisons and troops from the country, as well as integrating the Hajduks, previously operating as unsupervised, independent armed groups, into the Principality’s border defense. Emphasis also needed to be placed on establishing an arms industry in Serbia, including the construction of cannon foundries and gunpowder factories.51 In addition to political stability and the advancement of defense capabilities, the third pillar of domestic policy should be the development of industry (including new sectors such as chemistry, engineering, and mining) and trade and the establishment of a national financial institution system (a national bank).52

Another major area of domestic policy, Czartoryski felt, should focus on education and culture. According to his proposal, the Serbian state should prioritize the following four areas: developing the education system and literary life, supporting the publication of journals, creating cultural hubs, and fostering the Church.53 All these things would contribute to the strengthening of national consciousness.

Czartoryski’s Thoughts on Serbian Foreign Policy

In his vision of Serbia’s foreign policy, Czartoryski laid out principles that were adopted by the Belgrade government in the long term (by Ilija Garašanin). Czartoryski provided specific instructions on how to engage with the major European powers. In his opinion, Serbia should primarily consider France as a valuable partner, because France could provide the most reliable support for the Principality. By strengthening cultural and religious ties, it would be possible to lay the foundations for cooperation between Belgrade and Paris, for example by establishing Catholic institutions, allowing French missionaries to operate in Serbia, setting up consulates, and sending Serbian youth to gain experience in France.54 What is particularly interesting about this passage is that Czartoryski recommends using soft power tools to form an alliance with France rather than emphasizing traditional political and military alliances. This was a wholly novel approach to diplomacy. France was given a prominent role in Czartoryski’s vision because the Polish émigré network had also received effective assistance from France (as mentioned above). Although Czartoryski had good connections in London too, his decision to base himself in Paris at the Hôtel Lambert indicates the different expectations he had regarding the two western European powers. As Czartoryski put it, one must be cautious when dealing with England politically: “despite the inactivity and timidity of the French Cabinet, there is more sympathy and generosity in its policy than in that of England, which is always preoccupied with practical commercial interests.”55 The British government would only cooperate with Serbia if there were substantial economic interests at stake. “But if Serbia succeeds in obtaining a route to the Adriatic and a point on this sea,” Czartoryski argued, “the proximity of the Ionian Islands and Malta will make this country important for England and will assure it great political and financial advantages.”56 Until then, however, the prospect of British–Serbian cooperation remained uncertain. The suggestions made by Czartoryski in 1843, as well as his previously expressed views in Essai sur la diplomatie, provide evidence of his suspicions concerning British policy.57

Regarding the great powers in Central and Eastern Europe, Czartoryski concluded that Prussia was not relevant to Serbia, although it could become more significant in relation to Austria over time. He identified Vienna and St. Petersburg as the focal points of future Serbian foreign policy. Both great powers were of decisive importance for Serbia’s future. “There should be no misunderstanding about Austria’s intentions,” he cautioned. “[I]t is interested in taking action against the Slavic nationalities (…). It is therefore natural that the Vienna cabinet should view Serbia with discontent and mistrust and cause it as much embarrassment as possible.”58 Serbia, he felt, should therefore only maintain trade relations with Austria and should avoid closer ties with the Habsburg Empire. Interestingly, Czartoryski foresaw Austria’s (later Austria–Hungary’s) future expansion into the Balkan Peninsula, which would pose a genuine threat to Serbia.59

Another major issue was the relationship between Serbia and the Russian Empire. Belgrade had maintained close ties with Russia in previous decades, and the tsarist court sought to consolidate its regional influence. The government in St. Petersburg ensured the Balkan province political advantages and guarantees, which were laid down in the peace treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople.60 These gestures served to establish the political and economic independence of the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire and consolidate Russia’s dominance. St. Petersburg applied the same strategy not just towards Serbia but to the Danubian principalities.61 Taking all these processes into account, Czartoryski believed that Serbia should not rely on Russia as a protector, stating that through consistent diplomacy, it is possible to neutralise the image that Russia wants to project in Europe about its relationship with Serbia. Distancing itself from Russian cooperation would be beneficial in establishing good relations with other states.62

Finally, Czartoryski shared his thoughts on the Ottoman Empire. In the long run, Serbia’s fundamental goal was to become completely independent from the Ottoman Empire. However, it was important not to rush the process of severing ties, which potentially would have been seen as a threat to (and may well have been) the preservation of the empire. Czartoryski saw this as a very complex issue, both in relation to the Balkan states and to the independent Polish state. Although separation from the Porte was essential for the development of a Balkan nation state, the Ottoman Empire offered a kind of protection for Serbia until this were to happen. It provided an environment, Czartoryski felt, in which the Serbian Principality could thrive and gradually grow stronger. Therefore, Serbia must support the survival of the Ottoman Empire for as long as possible, while also standing up for its own interests against the Porte if necessary.63 Regarding Serbia’s relations with neighboring peoples, Czartoryski

urged Serbia to cooperate with them, as this could be pivotal for both Serbia’s territorial expansion and its relations with the other South Slavic peoples. The concept of uniting the Slavic population under Serbia’s leadership had already emerged in Czartoryski’s thinking, but only if it were based on the voluntary participation of these peoples. This idea had already been formulated.

Interestingly, a short draft titled Projet de Mémoire du Gouvernement Serbe64 was also published in the first volume of a new document series edited by nineteenth-century British diplomat, writer, and political agitator David Urquhart, known for his fierce opposition to Russian expansion and his passionate involvement in Balkan affairs.65 The Portfolio – New Series was launched in 1843 and was published in Paris.66 There are many question marks surrounding the alleged or actual relationship between Czartoryski and Urquhart, and it is certainly possible that they collaborated and were familiar with each other’s views on Serbia.67 Urquhart, who was of Scottish descent, was one of the era’s leading figures in informal politics.68 He was well acquainted with the Ottoman Empire and almost every region of the Balkans, and during his travels, he forged strong connections with the Porte and the prince’s court in Belgrade.69 He was one of the most qualified academics dealing with the Ottoman Empire and also one of the most prominent Balkan scholars of the nineteenth century, who regularly published his studies.70 Urquhart reinforced the position of diplomats and researchers who identified the expansion of the Russian Empire as a dire threat to Southeastern Europe. He expressed his anti-Russian sentiments in both his diplomatic activities and his public appearances. In the mid-1830s, he organized a press campaign aimed at strengthening Russophobic attitudes in British society.

Czartoryski and Urquhart had a great deal in common. They both engaged in acts of informal diplomacy. They both advocated action against the Russian Empire. They were both involved in the Philhellene movement and both supported the emergence of small nation states in the Balkans. They were both connected to the so-called Portfolio document series. And finally, they both regarded Paris as an important political center. Czartoryski made the French capital the hub of his activities, and Urquhart began publishing a new series of his abovementioned document collection in Paris in 1843.

Thus, Czartoryski and Urquhart had very similar views regarding both politics and the diplomatic methods to be adopted. They were also indirectly connected by one of the most significant international data breaches of the 1830s. The concept behind the Portfolio published by David Urquhart was to make sensitive diplomatic documents available to the public. The initial collection consisted of Russian diplomatic correspondence that had been leaked abroad during the Polish uprising of 1830–1831.71 In addition, Czartoryski closely followed Russia’s actions in the Caucasus, especially the events in Circassia, which almost led to a conflict between Russia and Great Britain.72 At the same time, Urquhart was trying to draw international attention to the Circassians. He was serving as member of the British diplomatic corps in Constantinople, from where he was recalled for the second time in 1837 due to his ardent anti-Russian behavior.73 According to Kukiel, it was at this point that Czartoryski contacted Urquhart directly.74 We do not know whether this is true, but it is clear is that, after 1833, the anti-Russian activities of Czartoryski and Urquhart became more important to the British government.75 Moreover, Urquhart had established excellent political connections in Serbia years earlier, and his work A Fragment from the History of Serbia also had a stimulating effect on the development of Serbia’s foreign policy and British relations with Serbia.76 It can therefore be assumed that Urquhart’s activities in southeastern Europe, his network of contacts, and his political methodology influenced the development of the Czartoryski network as a basic model of informal diplomacy (especially in Serbia).

Czartoryski’s vision was a milestone in the process of laying the foundations of Serbian foreign policy doctrine. František Zach and Ilija Garašanin later adopted his ideas concerning Serbia’s place and role in Southeastern Europe. Zach became a prominent figure in the Czartoryski émigré network in Belgrade. He espoused the nationalist approach, which replaced former empire-oriented thinking, the orientation toward Western great powers, and the notion of the necessity of containing the Habsburg Empire and Russia, as outlined by the Conseil.77 At the same time, a new idea emerged in Zach’s 1844 concept, drafted in his Plan pour la politique slave de la Serbie.78 Zach envisioned a combination of the Illyrian movement, Serbian political aspirations, and the formation of a South Slavic confederation.79 Later, this idea was embraced by Ilija Garašanin, who in the meantime had become the Serbian foreign minister (and who also served twice as prime minister of the Principality of Serbia). Garašanin assigned a leading role to Serbia in fostering cooperation among the South Slavic peoples. Furthermore, Garašanin incorporated key elements of the Czartoryski diplomatic model into his intelligence-gathering methodology, dedicating a separate chapter in Načertanije (meaning draft or outline; a confidential political program written by Garašanin in 1844) to the need to send agents to gain a deeper understanding of the social and political conditions in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Northern Albania, Slavonia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. These agents would assess the local communities’ attitudes towards Serbia in accordance with predetermined instructions and criteria. Subsequently, the Belgrade government would use this knowledge to develop the toolkit and strategy with which to begin fostering cooperation among the South Slavs.80 The Czartoryski network of agents probably provided a model for the Serbian intelligence service and foreign policy development.

The Bulgarian Alternative: Supporting Ecclesiastical Movement

The Czartoryski network adopted a completely different approach in its activities with respect to Bulgaria. In Serbia, the Hôtel Lambert group primarily sought through its diplomacy to support political nationalism, and it had and proclaimed a clear and transparent vision (see the above analysis of Czartoryski’s vision). Czartoryski’s objectives in both domestic and foreign policy were clearly defined, with comparatively small emphasis on Church policy. Although he proposed establishing French Catholic institutions and supporting missions, these steps were essentially intended to broaden Serbia’s diplomatic perspective and strengthen French–Serbian political relations. The situation was different in Bulgaria, however. Polish influence also had to be established in the eastern Balkan province under Ottoman rule, but this required different methods due to the specific nature of Bulgarian politics.

Czartoryski strove to establish active cooperation and relations in the Bulgarian territories, as he had done in Serbia. However, conditions were less favorable there, and he encountered many obstacles. First and foremost, the Bulgarian territories did not enjoy the same level of autonomy and self-determination as the Serbian Principality. Consequently, political organization was completely different. This was a period of national awakening in Bulgaria, during which religious movements played a particularly important role. The Hôtel Lambert’s attempts to establish a network of contacts in Bulgaria were primarily focused on the ecclesiastical sphere rather than the political sphere. During this period, French diplomacy underwent a transformation. Following the two Egyptian crises and the conclusion of the Dardanelles Agreement, the Paris government’s attention shifted away from Egypt. This was largely due to France’s failure during the second Egyptian crisis, which made it clear that the European great powers would unite to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, even if a new, viable alternative emerged in the Mediterranean region. The French foreign policy concept of supporting an independent Egyptian state was unworkable for the time being. In the early 1840s, Paris changed its strategy, and the Ottoman Empire and its Balkan provinces once again became the focus of French interest.81

Czartoryski believed that Bulgaria was a very important region in the eastern Balkans, a traditional geopolitical area from Russia’s perspective. For this reason, it was necessary to create a counterbalance to St. Petersburg and provide an alternative for the Christian population living there. Polish influence in Bulgaria relied heavily on French diplomatic and ecclesiastical relations. Although the French government wanted to open consulates in several cities in the 1840s, the diplomatic route was more difficult because this endeavor was promoted by French economist and historian Jérôme-Adolphe Blanqui, who traveled around the region after the Bulgarian uprising of 1841 and com­mu­nicated his experiences and insights to the French government.82 Nevertheless, the Ottoman government rejected requests to open more consulates, fearing that Russia would then make similar demands.83 Therefore, though a French consulate was established in Varna as early as 1842, none was opened in Sofia or Ruse.84 Consequently, the consular network could not form the basis for the development of the Polish network.

It is interesting to consider why the church movement provided better opportunities for the Czartoryski network. In Bulgaria, two processes emerged during the period of national awakening: the church movement (or ecclesiastical nationalism) and the political movement (or political nationalism).85 The church movement had been active since the 1830s and 1840s, and its leaders, Neofit Bozveli and Ilarion Makariopolski, worked to establish an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church organization.86 At that time, political movements were usually unable to operate on a large scale or in an organized manner. This made it difficult for the Czartoryski network to find partners willing to cooperate in this area. Agents, however, had more points of reference in the ecclesiastical sphere.

In Bulgaria, the primary objective was to forge close ties between the Catholic Church and the Bulgarian subjects with the help of the Polish émigré network. Initially, they attempted to establish indirect contact by supporting the local activities of French Lazarist monks.87 The Czartoryski network helped the Lazarists gain popularity in Bulgaria and supported them in their efforts to set up new Catholic schools in the Eastern Balkans. However, the activities of the Missionary Congregation alone were insufficient, as the efforts of French Catholics yielded few visible results among the Bulgarian population.88 New tools were needed, and it was at this point that the Bulgarian church movement, the goals of which were compatible with some Polish political objectives, began to gain recognition. Those seeking to establish an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church encountered numerous challenges in the 1840s and sought supporters. In 1843, when Ilarion Makariopolski was in Constantinople, they contacted the Czartoryski network via Michał Czajkowski.89 The goal of the Bulgarian church movement was to break away from the Patriarchate of Constantinople and establish an independent Bulgarian Exarchate. To implement the policy of the Czartoryski network, Czajkowski sent agents to Bulgaria to advance the Bulgarian cause and to promote and strengthen the influence of the Catholic Church in the region.90 They also supported the Orthodox movement, for instance, by helping organize the petition campaign between 1844 and 1846.91 Thus, Polish–Bulgarian cooperation became a reality. However, the situation changed significantly by the end of the 1840s. A serious disagreement arose between Czartoryski and Czajkowski regarding the future of the large number of Polish émigrés arriving in Bulgaria following the 1848–1849 revolutions and the level of support to be provided for the Orthodox and Catholic movements.92 This disagreement had two major consequences. First, Czajkowski withdrew from the work of organizing the Hôtel Lambert’s regional policy. Second, the remaining Polish agents in Bulgaria dedicated themselves specifically to helping the Unitarian Church movement, which was led by Dragan Tsankov.

Supporting the Bulgarian Catholic movement was an obvious choice for Czartoryski’s diplomacy, and through the mediation of the Czartoryski network, the Papal State recognized its accession to the Catholic Church in 1860.93 The following year, Pope Pius IX appointed Josif Sokolski as archbishop, and the Bulgarian Uniate Church was also recognized as an independent church by the Sultan’s government.94 However, Sokolski’s career was short-lived. Two months later, he became involved in one of the most controversial cases of informal diplomatic manipulation: the abduction of the Bulgarian archbishop by Russian agents. The archbishop was taken from Constantinople to Odessa and later to Kiyv, where he later wrote letters to his community advocating a return to the Orthodox faith, presumably under duress.95 The intervention severely hampered the strengthening of the Church. Even Sokolski’s successor was unable to reverse this trend. Thousands returned to the Orthodox faith. Another problem was that Polish support was undermined by the pope’s decision to appoint priests of Polish origin to lead the Bulgarian Catholic Church rather than priests of Bulgarian origin. One important example is Franciszek Malczyński, who became head of the Uniate Church in 1863.96 Both of these two Church leaders proved disappointingly ineffective during the early years of the Bulgarian Uniate Church, and the Uniate Church movement was essentially unable to serve the cause of Bulgarian national advancement.

While the Polish network supported the Catholic Unitarian movement with everything at its disposal, Russia effectively supported the Bulgarians in their quest for independence from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Consequently, the issue of the independent Orthodox Church in Bulgaria also became a source of rivalry between Polish and Russian diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Czartoryski network was ultimately unable to achieve any significant results in this area and after 1870, Polish influence in Bulgaria ceased entirely.97

Conclusion

Adam Czartoryski’s political views on the Balkans evolved gradually over the course of decades, reflecting turning points in his life and his changing perceptions. However, certain elements remained constant throughout this process. One such idea was the outspoken importance of the Balkans as a geopolitical region, evidently appearing in Czartoryski’s ideas from his earliest foreign policy plans. Although his focus occasionally shifted to other areas of European politics, depending on developments regarding the Polish Question, the Ottoman Empire and its Balkan provinces again became more important to him after 1831.

An important development in Czartoryski’s thought was his move away from the traditional imperialist perspective by the 1830s. Even within the context of Eastern and Southeastern European relations, which were dominated by empires, he recognized the real, policy-shaping significance of small states. Agents of his innovative diplomatic network built on this idea and attempted to support Serbia’s and Bulgaria’s national ambitions. Czartoryski was one of the leading proponents of the idea of small independent states and regional cooperation among these nations, potentially even including federation, and this idea was to have an immense and long-lasting impact on the foreign policy of the states in question, particularly Serbia. The Belgrade government welcomed Czartoryski’s counsel and embraced his vision as it sought to develop local cooperation and establish relations with the great powers of Europe. Other politicians who influenced Serbian strategy, such as David Urquhart and, later, František Zach, based their political thinking mainly on Czartoryski’s ideas.

The history of emerging forms of cooperation among the Balkan peoples in the nineteenth century is fraught with complexity. Numerous authors used the term “Balkan federation” (including Czartoryski himself). However, as Árpád Hornyák has pointed out, when the theoretical idea moved into the phase of implementation and there was a genuine political will to strengthen ties among the Balkan states, it may have been more appropriate to speak of “Balkan cooperation” rather than a “federation,” since the aim was not to create a federation in the modern sense, but rather a system of regional cooperation or alliances among small states.98 This concept is also reflected in Ilija Garašanin’s aforementioned Načertanije, which, following his reappointment as foreign minister in 1861, became the programmatic foundation of Serbian foreign policy. The Načertanije placed great emphasis on cooperation with Bulgaria in the 1860s. During this period, the Serbian government made numerous attempts to support the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, thereby promoting Bulgaria’s independence.99 An alliance with Bulgaria would have strengthened Serbia and the wider Balkan region against Russian influence.100 To some extent, this support was in line with Serbian interests. However, it could be argued that support for Bulgaria’s independence was largely indirect. Another significant aspect of Czartoryski’s influence on Balkan politics was the ambition of the Belgrade government to establish a strong regional position while maintaining a certain distance from Russia and Austria.

Although Czartoryski’s approach to foreign policy enjoyed only a short-lived period of influence in Serbia (lasting only until the 1870s) and was never fully embraced in Bulgaria due to prevailing political conditions and the lack of internal support, it still had a significant influence on the political thinking of both Serbia and Bulgaria. Furthermore, Czartoryski’s informal yet highly organized international network reshaped the tools of contemporary diplomacy to some extent, bringing a new dimension to the system of international relations in the nineteenth century and highlighting the importance and necessity of effective information gathering. The intelligence services of Austria–Hungary provide a good example of this. Even before 1867, the Habsburg Empire already had an extensive network of agents abroad, and their activities increased following the revolutions of 1848–1849. However, the purpose and scope of this network differed significantly from that of the Polish one. Its primary task was to monitor émigré activities, extending beyond the Ottoman Empire to Central and Western Europe and the United States.101 Following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, however, the intelligence system was restructured and integrated into the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs, creating the so-called Informationsbüro as the main intelligence institution and, following the appointment of Count Gyula Andrássy (due to the growing importance of the South Slavic question), it focused intensely on the Balkan region.102 In terms of its information-gathering techniques, the organization relied heavily on the former Austrian network of agents that was active in the 1840s and 1850s. Presumably influenced by the decades of experience of the Czartoryski network, these agents employed informal methods of information gathering, blurring the boundary between the informal and official spheres.

As the Czartoryski network gradually faded from the scene, a new intelligence-­­gathering methodology emerged within Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, which also relied in part on Polish emigrants, both from the 1830s and the 1840s. This methodology had already been applied within the framework of official foreign policy (and has been analyzed in detail by Imre Ress in this volume).103 In summary, it is reasonable to say that the Czartoryski network, though it was not a government intelligent agency, was undoubtedly a predecessor to the professional intelligence services established in the second half of the nineteenth century in most of the modernizing states of Europe.

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Zawadzki, W. H. A Man of Honour: Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman of Russia and Poland, 1795–1831. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Zlatanov, Aleksandar. “Michał Czajkowski/Sadık Pasha and His Ottoman Cossack Regiment as Agents of Modernization.” In Transforming Southeast Europe during the Long Nineteenth Century: Persons and Personalities as Agents of Modernization in the Ottoman and the Post-Ottoman Space, edited by B. Antonova-Goleva and I. Masheva, 33–65. Ledien: Brill, 2024. doi:10.30965/9783657760022_003.

Zlatanov, Aleksandar. “Pragmatic Allegiance: The Conversion Case of the Political Agent Michał Czajkowski.” In Becoming Ottoman: Converts, Renegades and Competing Loyalties in the Early Modern and Modern Ages, edited by Yavuz Köse, Petr Kucera, and Tobias Völker, 159–80. London: Tauris, 2024.

Zurek, Piotr. “Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and the Plan of the Balkan Federation (1804–1806).” Povijesni prilozi 21, no. 22 (2002): 159–65.

Widerszal, Ludwik. Sprawy kaukaskie w polityce europejskiej w latach 1831–1864 [Caucasian issues in European politics, 1831–1864]. Warsaw: Nakł. Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, 1934.

Екмечић, Милорад. Дуго кретање између клања и орања: Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492–1992) [A long journey between slaughter and ploughing: The history of the Serbs in the Modern Age, 1492–1992]. Београд: Завод за Уџбенике, 2008.

Златанов, Александър. “Балканската политика на ‘Отел Ламбер’ и установяването на Източната агенция в Цариград (1831–1842)” [The Balkan policy of “Hotel Lambert” and the establishment of the Eastern Agency in Constantinople, 1831–1842]. История 28, no. 3 (2020): 250–69.

Кудрявцева, Е. П. “Политика России на Балканах” [Policy of Russia in the Balkans]. In История внешней политики России: Первая половина XIX века. От войн Росии против Наполеона до Пaрижского мира 1856 г. [The history of Russian foreign policy: The first half of the nineteenth century. From Russia’s wars against Napoleon to the Peace of Paris in 1856], ред. О. В. Орлик, 309–24. Москва: Международные отношения, 1995.

Михайлов, В. Б. “Революционный кризис 1830–1831 годов: Царизм в борьбе с ‘демоном революции’” [The revolutionary crisis of 1830–1831: Tsarism in the struggle with the “demon of revolution”]. In История внешней политики России: Первая половина XIX века. От войн Росии против Наполеона до Пaрижского мира 1856 г. [The history of Russian foreign policy: The first half of the nineteenth century. From Russia’s wars against Napoleon to the Peace of Paris in 1856], ред. О. В. Орлик, 283–98. Москва: Международные отношения, 1995.

Михайлов, В. Б. “Восточный кризис 1839–1841 годов и русско–английское сближение” [The Eastern Crisis of 1839–1841 and the Russian–English rapprochment]. In История внешней политики России: Первая половина XIX века. От войн Росии против Наполеона до Пaрижского мира 1856 г. [The history of Russian foreign policy: The first half of the nineteenth century. From Russia’s wars against Napoleon to the Peace of Paris in 1856], ред. О. В. Орлик, 325–45. Москва: Международные отношения, 1995.

Русев, Иван. “Първият опит за откриване на френско консулство в София през 1842 г.” [The first attempt to open a French consulate in Sofia in 1842]. Bulgarian Historical Review. Studia In Honorem Professoris Virginiae Paskaleva 34, no. 1–2 (2006): 473–85.

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1. 1 Zawadzki, A Man of Honour, 41–43; Dziewanowski, “Czartoryski and His Essai sur la Diplomatie,” 590; Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 110–11.

2. 2 Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 111–12.

3. 3 Smyk, “Polish Precursors of United Europe,” 359.

4. 4 Ibid., 360–61.

5. 5 During this period, Czartoryski drew up three important plans that fundamentally determined the foreign policy direction of the Russian Empire. In 1803, he wrote a draft titled “System for Russian Foreign Policy.” See Patricia Kennedy Grimsted’s publication and analysis: Grimsted, “Czartoryski’s System for Russian Foreign Policy, 1803”; Skowronek, “Le programme européen du prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryskien 1803–1805.” It is also important to mention the plans developed by Czartoryski in 1804 and 1806, which dealt with the Balkan region in detail: “Note by Prince Adam Czatoryski (1804),” in Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski, 53–55, no. 75–77; “Записка Чарторижскаго, 11 (23) января 1806 г.,” in Сборник Императорского Русского исторического общества, т. 82, 244–75, no. 78; Доклад Чарторижскаго, 11 (23) января 1806 г., in Сборник Императорского Русского исторического общества, т. 82, 275–78. For an analysis of early Balkan concepts, see Schrek and Demeter, “Adam Czartoryski Balkán-koncepciói”; Zurek, “Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and the Plan.” In fact, the Balkan concepts of Adam Czartoryski from 1804–1806 were also considered by Alexander Ypsilantis, the leader of the uprising of 1821, which sparked the Greek War of Independence. Taki, “Russia on the Danube,” 82.

6. 6 Schrek, “The Congress of Vienna and the Maintenance of European Order,” 201, 206–7.

7. 7 Capodistrias was president of the Republic of the Seven Islands, which existed from 1799 to 1807, and he maintained good relations with the Russian ambassador, Mocenigo. After the Russian Empire made peace with the French Empire in Tilsit, however, the archipelago once again came under French influence under the terms of the treaty. Capodistrias subsequently left the Ionian Islands and entered the Russian foreign service. Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 229–30; Papadopoulos-Vretós, Mémoires biographiques historiques sur le président de la Grèce, 8–10, 13.

8. 8 At the Congress of Vienna, for example, Capodistrias managed to get the Ionian Islands recognized as independent. Correspondance du comte J. Capodistrias, vol. 1, 32.

9. 9 After 1815, Philipp von Neumann was First Secretary at the Austrian Embassy in London, alongside Paul Antal Esterházy.

10. 10 September 1–2, 1819. Diary of Philipp von Neumann, vol. 1.

11. 11 Taki, “Russia on the Danube,” 67.

12. 12 Zawadzki, A Man of Honour, 288.

13. 13 In his letters, Capodistrias mentioned the aid that was expected from Russia on several occasions. See Circulaire à tous les fonctionnaires publics. Poros, 18/30 mai 1828. Correspondance du comte J. Capodistrias, vol. 2, 131–32.

14. 14 Taki, “Russia on the Danube,” 171–72.

15. 15 Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 73–78; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 663.

16. 16 Михайлов, “Революционный кризис 1830–1831 годов,” 292; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, 707.

17. 17 Czartoryski, Essai sur la diplomatie ou manuscript d’un Philhellene, 2.

18. 18 Ibid., 10.

19. 19 Ibid., 5.

20. 20 A typical example of this is the territorial expansion efforts that took place in 1814–1815. Czartoryski, Essai sur la diplomatie ou manuscript d’un Philhellene, 223–28.

21. 21 Ibid., 275.

22. 22 Ibid., 255–56. Following the chapter on justice and injustice, Czartoryski attempts to justify his standpoint by citing the examples of Austria and Russia. In his view, neither state gained any advantage from having annexed Italian or Polish territories. Austria was unable to increase its power or security by expanding into Italy, and Russia only further corrupted the empire by acquiring new Polish territories. See Czartoryski, Essai sur la diplomatie ou manuscript d’un Philhellene, 264–70.

23. 23 Dziewanowski, “Czartoryski and His Essai sur la Diplomatie,” 595.

24. 24 Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski, 55.

25. 25 Dziewanowski, “Czartoryski and His Essai sur la Diplomatie,” 596.

26. 26 Златанов, “Балканската политика на ‘Отел Ламбер’,” 251–52.

27. 27 In his study, Hahn wrote about these orientations within the Czartoryński network: Hahn, “Das Hôtel Lambert 1831–1847,” 353.

28. 28 Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 232.

29. 29 Members of the Polish émigré community sought to counterbalance Russia’s growing influence, as evidenced by the appearance of Czartoryski agents in the Balkan provinces where Russia had gained significant influence in the 1830s. See Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 94.

30. 30 Berry, “Czartoryski’s Hôtel Lambert,” 32–33.

31. 31 Кудрявцева, “Политика России на Балканах,” 312–14; Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 233.

32. 32 Berry, “Polish Diplomatic Activities in the Ottoman Empire,” 32–33. At first, the Czartoryski network aimed to support French foreign policy, hoping to secure the backing of a great power for the Polish cause. This explains why the Czartoryski network sent agents to the East during the First Egyptian Crisis and established a new base in Constantinople. Following Franciszek Zach’s successful campaign in Belgrade and the Serbian adoption of the so-called Garašanin Plan, however, the network became Slavophile, and it deemed it unnecessary to maintain the Ottoman Empire to prevent Russian expansion. For more details on the establishment of the Constantinople network and the shift in perspective, see Aleksandar Zlatanov’s recent article in this issue, “The Establishment of the Eastern Agency in Constantinople as a Center for Polish Exile Missions in the Ottoman Balkans in the 1830s and 1840s.”

33. 33 Berry, “Polish Diplomatic Activities in the Ottoman Empire,” 33–34.

34. 34 Ibid., 33; Michał Czajkowski, however, who had to apply this method in practice, found it controversial. See, Zlatanov, “The Establishment of the Eastern Agency.”

35. 35 This idea was clearly expressed by Czartoryski in his 1843 ideas concerning Serbia. For more details, see later.

36. 36 Berry, Polish Diplomatic Activities in the Ottoman Empire,” 33.

37. 37 The aforementioned Aleksandar Zlatanov has done the most recent research on this Polish nobleman and his role within the Czartoryski network. See Zlatanov, “Pragmatic Allegiance”; Zlatanov, “Michał Czajkowski/Sadık Pasha; Златанов, “Балканската политика на ‘Отел Ламбер’”; A brand new volume, scheduled for publication in 2026, also sheds new light on the functioning of the Czartoryski network. Olsowszka et. al., Polish–Turkish Relations from the Eighteenth through the Twentieth Century.

38. 38 The original name of this agency was Agencja Wschodnia or Agencja Misji Polskiej na Wschodzie. For more information on its operations, see: Zlatanov, “Балканската политика на ‘Отел Ламбер’,” 260.

39. 39 Zlatanov, “Michał Czajkowski/Sadık Pasha,” 36–38.

40. 40 Златанов, “Балканската политика на ‘Отел Ламбер’,” 255.

41. 41 Hoare, Serbia: A Modern History, 77–81; Jelavich and Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 58; Forró and Cvetković, “The Birth of Modern Serbia,” 117–18.

42. 42 The leaders of the Constitutional Party were Toma Vučić Perišić, Avram Petronijević, and Ilija Garašanin. Jelavich and Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 61.

43. 43 The Czartoryski network had a representative in Belgrade even before 1842: Ludwik Zierkowski–Lenoir. See Zlatanov, “The Establishment of the Eastern Agency.”

44. 44 Schrek, “Diverse Diplomacy.”

45. 45 František Zach had previously been in contact with Polish émigrés and the Czartoryski network, but he became more actively involved from 1840 onwards. For more details, see Zajac, Hôtel Lambert and the Austrian Empire, 170–71.

46. 46 Zajac, Hôtel Lambert and the Austrian Empire, 172.

47. 47 This interpretation highlights the significance of the anti-Russian lobbying activities carried out by Great Britain in Serbia, as well as the rivalry that developed between the British and Russian consulates in Belgrade. Representatives of the two states joined the debate surrounding the constitution, each seeking to strengthen its position. While the British favored strengthening the position of the Serbian prince, Russia supported the pro-constitutional political forces. Pavlowitch, “Biritsh Diplomacy and the Serbian Constitution of 1838,” 163.

48. 48 The following study provides a general overview of this topic: Dworski, “The Balkan as a Gateway.”

49. 49 Czartoryski clearly draws on Polish historical experience in this regard.

50. 50 There was already precedent for this. For example, skilled Polish officers who had fled abroad in 1831 played a significant role in establishing the national army of the newly created Kingdom of Belgium. Draper, The Belgian Army, 36.

51. 51 Czartoryski also offered to provide Polish expertise and experience in this regard.

52. 52 Czartoryski felt that under no circumstances should Austrian assistance be sought for this purpose.

53. 53 A high degree of tolerance should be shown, according to Czartoryski, towards denominations other than the national church. Le Prince Adam Czartoryski, Conseils sur la conduite à suivre par la Serbie (January 1843), 212.

54. 54 Ibid., 208–9.

55. 55 Ibid., 209.

56. 56 Ibid., 209–10.

57. 57 Essai sur la diplomatie ou manuscript d’un Philhellene, 229–38.

58. 58 Conseils sur la conduite à suivre par la Serbie. In Bataković, Foreign Policy of Serbia (1844–1867), 208.

59. 59 For more information on future conflicts, see Armour, Apple of Discord; Palotás, Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia alkáni politikája.

60. 60 No. 25. 110. Трактатъ о миръ между Россіею и Оттоманскою Портою, in Полное собрание законов Российской Империи, 316–32; No. 103. Мирный договор между Россией и Османской империей. Адрианополь, 2 (14) сентября 1829 г., in Внешняя политика России, 261–70.

61. 61 Schrek, “Diverse Dilomacy.”

62. 62 Conseils sur la conduite à suivre par la Serbie. In Bataković, Foreign Policy of Serbia (1844–1867), 207–8.

63. 63 Ibid., 205–7.

64. 64 The Portfolio. Diplomatic Review. New Series. Vol. 1, 71–76.

65. 65 The identity of the author of the article remains uncertain. Milorad Ekmečić assumes that the text is an early draft of Garašanin’s Načertanije, whereas Jelena Milojković-Djurić attributes it to Urquhart. See Екмечић, Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у Новом веку (1492–1992), 225; Milojković-Djuri, “David Urquhart’s Perceptions of the Eastern Question,” 207.

66. 66 Milojković-Djuri, “David Urquhart’s Perceptions of the Eastern Question,” 207.

67. 67 We have no specific information on this matter.

68. 68 He was also an official diplomat twice in Constantinople.

69. 69 Milojković-Djurić, “David Urquhart’s Perceptions of the Eastern Question,” 205–7.

70. 70 Schrek, “Evaluation of Russia’s and the Sublime Porte’s Great Power Status,” 2015.

71. 71 Kukiel, Czartoryski and the European Unity 1770–1861, 236; Schrek and Demeter, “Adam Czartoryski Balkán koncepciói,” 105.

72. 72 Widerszal, Sprawy kaukaskie w polityce europejskiej, 58.

73. 73 This explains his animosity towards Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston, who was serving as British Foreign Secretary at the time and who favored a more restrained approach to Russia.

74. 74 Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 235.

75. 75 Widerszal, Sprawy kaukaskie w polityce europejskiej, 39–46.

76. 76 For Urquhart’s activities in Serbia, see Štermenski, David Urquhart the First British Diplomat in Serbia; Milojković-Djurić, “David Urquhart’s Perceptions of the Eastern Question.”

77. 77 Although František Zach advocated an even more strongly anti-Austrian stance. Zajac, Hôtel Lambert and the Austrian Empire, 174.

78. 78 See Zach’s Serbian Slavic Plan in Bataković, “The Foreign Policy of Serbia,” 221–43.

79. 79 Schrek and Demeter, “Adam Czartoryski Balkán-koncepciói,” 103–5.

80. 80 See Bataković, “The Foreign Policy of Serbia,” 249–50.

81. 81 Voillery, “Un aspect de la rivalité franco-russe,” 32.

82. 82 Voillery, “Un aspect de la rivalité franco-russe,” 32; Blanqui, Voyage en Bulgarie.

83. 83 Roussev, “Les permiers pas de la penetration consulaire française en Bulgarie,” 716; Voillery, “Un aspect de la rivalité franco-russe,” 33. The following study discusses the establishment of the consulate in Varna in detail: Русев, “Първият опит за откриване на френско консулство в София,” 473–85.

84. 84 The opening of the consulate in Varna was mainly driven by economic considerations. François Gustav Olive and his business partner had established a grain trading company called Olive Tedeschi & Cie, and this venture motivated them to request the French Foreign Ministry to establish a vice-consulate in Varna. Roussev, “Les permiers pas de la penetration consulaire française en Bulgarie,” 717.

85. 85 Both ecclesiastical and political movements can be divided into several different factions. On the notions of ecclesiastical nationalism and political nationalism, see Eleonora Naxidou’s study “The Routes to the Bulgarian National Movement.”

86. 86 The initial goal of the Bulgarian church movement was to reform and reorganize the Orthodox Church. This would have been made possible by the Gülhane Hatt-i Serif, which marked the beginning of the Tanzimat era. However, the Patriarchate of Constantinople showed no openness or willingness to negotiate this transformation. In fact, it opposed the ambitions of Bozveli and Makariopolski. The second phase of the movement, which began in the 1850s, sought complete independence for the Bulgarian Church rather than reorganization. Naxidou, “The Routes to the Bulgarian National Movement,” 32.

87. 87 French–Polish cooperation is evident here, too. On the activity of the Lazarites, see the article by Zlatanov, “The Establishment of the Eastern Agency.”

88. 88 Popek, “The Polish Episodes of the Bulgarian Church Movement,” 97–98.

89. 89 Ibid., 98; Herung, “Ilarion Makariopolski.”

90. 90 Popek, “Niewygodny, acz bezsilny partner,” 122–27.

91. 91 Ibid.,” 127–30.

92. 92 Ibid., 131.

93. 93 Popek, “The Polish Episodes of the Bulgarian Church Movement,” 100; Detrez, Historical Dictionary of Bulgaria, 495–96.

94. 94 Balkán kronológia, vol. 1, 166; Popek, “The Polish Episodes of the Bulgarian Church Movement,” 100.

95. 95 Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 244–46.

96. 96 Popek, “The Polish Episodes of the Bulgarian Church Movement,” 100; Frazee, Catholics and Sultans, 246.

97. 97 Popek, “The Polish Episodes of the Bulgarian Church Movement,” 101.

98. 98 Hornyák, “A Balkán-összefogás gondolatának fejlődése,” 7. Furthermore, on the development of Balkan concepts in the early nineteenth century, see Bíró, “A modern szerb államiság kezdetei”; Schrek and Demeter, “Adam Czartoryski Balkán-koncepciói.”

99. 99 Papadiranos, “The First Balkan Alliance,” 16–18; For example, to support the activity of Georgi Rakovski, but after the political turn of 1868 in Belgrade, they soon abandoned his Bulgarian concept.

100. 100 Hornyák, “A Balkán-összefogás gondolatának fejlődése,” 8.

101. 101 Ress, “A kormányzati hírszolgálat,” 47–48.

102. 102 Ibid., 54–55.

103. 103 See the article of Imre Ress in this issue, “The Transformation of the Government Intelligence Service in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.”

* The present study is a result of the project STARTING 150326 “Geopolitical Tendencies and Balkan Strategy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Individual Sources and Foreign Policy Actors (1878–1918).” Project no. 150326 has been implemented with the support provided by the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund, financed under the STARTING 24 funding scheme.